Objectivity is Unnatural

July 18, 2019 Leave a comment
Remember that objectivity is unnatural. To objectify is to separate and distance one part of an experience as an object of another part’s sensitivity.
If we begin with the universe as an eternal dream-like experience*, biology or life is to dream that the rest of the universe is an object. It is the first level of dream within a dream…a dream of nature one step removed. This is a huge step. It isolates one tiny sliver of nature in a spatio-temporal contract of mortality during which almost nothing can be sensed at all. It is a nearly senseless void except for whatever primitive sensations and emotions characterize life (pain-pleasure, tension-relaxation).
The first level of life objectifies the rest of the universal dream as a geometric-tangible edifice of non-life and ‘real’ surfaces (since it poses an existential threat to the mortality contract itself).
The second level of life adds the dimension of intentional movement. This adds to the realism of the non-living world with a new realism of self-as-body. Even on the microbiological scale, the animal experience is founded on the awareness of self as tangible body (object, shape, morphe) navigating purposefully in a world of tangible objects. This is the beginning of the phoric-morphic duality, and the ancestor of our subjective-objective sense of duality.
The third level of life adds a brain to the body. This is essentially a Level 2 body nested within another Level 2 body, nested within a Level 1 life within the Level 0 dream/God/cosmos. This nesting adds a second level of objectivity in which both the body and the world of the body can be viewed from a distance. The brain gives us an invisible body from which we can not only experience as subject-objects (living bodies) but thinking selves who can think about ourselves as intangible subjects and tangible objects, and also the world in the same ways, and also all of the relationships between the two. That’s another huge leap and it gives us the dimension of intentional thought…right and wrong thoughts.
The fourth level adds a level beyond the brain and thinking mind, which we have to infer or intuit because is can’t be perceptually objectified while we are alive. This is what makes us fully, deeply human and allows us not only to subj-objectify ourselves and the entire natural world, but to do the same for subjectivity-objectivity itself.
Of course this is only a rough sketch. There may be more intermediate levels, especially between 0 and 1 where stars and atoms become objectified by experiences which are later objectified as molecules and solar systems, etc.
Anyhow, I hope that helps some/any of you understand what I’m proposing and what I mean by Multisense Realism: A single universe of anesthetically** nested aesthetic experiences in which the nesting polarizes and extends qualities of realism-fantasy, objectivity-subjectivity.
*Dream-like in the sense of having no more ‘real’ substrate, not in the sense of being insubstantial or unreal.
** Spatial, temporal, and modal appearances of entropy.

Science of Consciousness 2019

July 2, 2019 Leave a comment


Full PDF of poster

It was great to be in Interlaken Switzerland for my fifth Science of Consciousness conference. I met some great friends, old and new, and had some great conversations while sightseeing one of the most beautiful places on Earth. Thanks to everyone there and hope to see many of you soon at the next convention(s?).

De-Simulating Natural Intelligence

May 24, 2019 Leave a comment

Hi friends! I’m getting ready for my poster presentation at the Science of Consciousness conference in Interlaken:

Abstract In recent years, scientific and popular imagination has been captured by the idea that what we experience directly is a neuro-computational simulation. At the same time, there is a contradictory idea that some things that we experience, such as the existence of brains and computers, are real enough to allow us to create fully conscious and intelligent devices. This presentation will try to explain where this logic breaks down, why true intelligence may never be generated artificially, and why that is good news. Recent studies have suggested that human perception is not as limited as previously thought and that while machines can do many things better than we can, becoming conscious may not be one of them. The approach taken here can be described as a Variable Aspect Monism or Multisense Realism, and it seeks to clarify the relationship between physical form, logical function, and aesthetic participation.

In Natural Intelligence, intelligence is abstracted from within a full spectrum of aesthetically rich experience that developed over billions of years of evolving sensation and participation.

In Artificial “Intelligence”, intelligence is abstracted from outside the natural, presumably narrow range of barely aesthetic experience that has remained relatively unchanged over human timescales (but has changed over geological timescales, evolving, presumably, very different aesthetics).

In Natural Intelligence, intelligence is abstracted from within a full spectrum of aesthetically rich experience that developed over billions of years of evolving sensation and participation.

In Artificial “Intelligence”, intelligence is abstracted from outside the natural, presumably narrow range of barely aesthetic experience that has remained relatively unchanged over human timescales (but has changed over geological timescales, evolving, presumably, very different aesthetics).

What Multisense Realism proposes is more pansensitivity than panpsychism.

The standard notion of panpsychism is what I would call ‘promiscuous panpsychism’, meaning that every atom has to be ‘conscious’ in a kind of thinking, understanding way. I think that this promiscuity is what makes panpsychism unappealing to many/most people.

Under pansensitivity, intelligence 𝒅𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒈𝒆𝒔 from a totalistic absolute, diffracting through calibrated degrees of added insensitivity. It’s like in school when kids draw a colorful picture and then cover it with black crayon (the pre-big bang) and then begin to scratch it off to reveal the colors underneath. The black crayon is entropy, the scratching is negentropy, and the size of the revealed image is the degree of aesthetic saturation.

So yes, the physical substances that we use to build machines are forms of conscious experience, but they are very low level, low aesthetics which don’t necessarily scale up on their own (since they have not evolved over billions of years of natural experience by themselves).

I think that despite our success in putting our own high level aesthetic experience into code that we use to manipulate hardware, it is still only reflecting of our own natural ‘psychism’ back to us, rather than truly exporting it into the machine hardware.

Holosense Model

February 6, 2019 Leave a comment


3holosensemodel.jpgVersion 2 better or worse?

Sense and Simulation

February 5, 2019 2 comments


1. Nothing that can be experienced is a simulation.

There are different levels of perception (experiences of experience) and interpretation (experiences of understanding perceptions), and they can spoof each other, but all experiences are as fundamentally real any physical substance or process.

If you look in at a mirror, you are *really* seeing a *real* image, it’s just that your body isn’t really inside of a mirror. Your physical body can’t actually be seen, it can only be touched and felt. What can be seen is an image (made of color contrast shapes) that reflects both low-level tangible-public and high-level intangible-psychological conditions.

2. The Hard Problem of Consciousness can be reduced to this question: “How can a particle, force or field become sensitive?“

I think that the answer is that it cannot. Rather, we have to invert our Western presumptions about nature and understand that fields and forces are concepts that may need be replaced by a more accurate one: direct sensory-perceptive and motive-participatory phenomena – aka nested conscious experiences.
Particles are the way that the division and polarization of experience is rendered in the tangible-tactile modality of sensory-perception.

They are not sensitive, and no structure composed of particles is sensitive, just as no words made of letters generate meaning. The particles and structures, words and letters are literally place-holders…spatiotemporally anchored addresses through which experiences can be organized in increasingly complex, rich, and meaningful ways. This is what nature and the universe is: An anti-mechanical sensory experience of mechanically divided experiencers…an aesthetic holos that renders its self-diffraction through anesthetic holography.

Can Qualia Be Simulated?

January 19, 2019 4 comments

My response to this Quora question:

The Integrated Information Theory claims, that a computer simulation of a brain would produce the same behaviour, but wouldn’t have any qualia. If qualia don’t make any difference, does it mean, they don’t exist? Is it a contradiction?

There are several considerations upon which the answer to this question hinges:

  • The nature of simulation and behavior.
    1. The term simulation is an informal one. I don’t place a high value on discussing the definition of words, but I think that it is essential that if we are talking about something that exists in the world, we have to understand what that thing is supposed to be. I would say that the contemporary sense of ‘simulation’ goes back to early applications of computer software, specifically Flight Simulator programs. We have since become accustomed to using video ‘simulations’ of everything from fighting on a battlefield to performing surgery. Does it make sense to ask whether a flight simulator is producing the same behavior as an airplane? If it did, would we say that the program had produced a flight from Rome to New York? If the flight simulator crashed, would we have to have a funeral for the simulated passengers? I would say no. Common sense would tell us that the simulation is just software…the airplane isn’t real. This takes us to the next consideration, what is real?
    2. The term real is an informal one as well. We talk about ‘reality’ but that can refer to some abstract truth that we seem to agree on or to a concrete world that we seem to share. To understand why there may be an important difference between a simulation and the ‘real thing’ that is being simulated, we should approach it in a more rigorous way. Flying a real airplane involves tons of physical matter, as well as countless causal links to the world/universe. The real airplane is the result of billions of years of accumulated change in the physical universe, as well as the evolution of numerous species and societies to engineer flight. There is a common comparison of the flight of an airplane to the flight of a bird or insect, where we are meant to think of both types of physical acts as ‘flying’, even though that flight is accomplished in quite different ways. I think that this comparison, however, is misleading. I would look to the famous quote by Alfred Korzybski, “The map is not the territory” instead when relating to simulating consciousness. Whether it is a literal geographical map or some other piece of graphic ‘art’ that ‘maps’ to a potentially real (in the concrete, worldly sense) place, the idea is that just because something appears visually similar to us does not mean that there is any other deep connection between the two. I’m not a photograph of my face. I’m not even a video of myself talking. This understanding is also expressed in the famous Magritte painting “The Treachery of Images”.
  • The nature of qualia.
    • Properly understood, what the term ‘qualia’ refers to exists by definition. It can get a little mystical if we rely on descriptions of qualia such as “what X is like” or “what it is like to feel X”, so I think it adds clarity if we look at it this way: Qualia is what is experienced. Information is a concept. Matter is a concept. Concepts are experienced also, but what the concept of matter refers to should/must be divided into the idea of matter as defined by the Standard Model (which has to do with exotic elementary “particles/waves” such as bosons and fermions which make up slightly less exotic atoms). Physical matter is made of atoms on the periodic table.
    • What we experience directly is not physical matter. What we experience are aesthetic presentations with tactile/tangible qualities such as shape, position, weight, texture, etc. We can dream of worlds filled with tangible objects, and we can interact with them as if they were physical matter, but these dream objects are not composed of the elements on the periodic table. The question of whether these objects are real depends on whether we are able to wake up from the dream. If we do not ever awaken from a dream, I don’t see any way of evaluating the realism of the contents of the dream. To the contrary, when we do awaken from a dream, we are often puzzled by our acceptance of dream conditions which seem clearly absurd and impossible.
    • That fact is very important in my view, as it tells us that either it is impossible to ever know whether anything we are experiencing is real, or it tells us that if we can know reality when we truly experience it, then experience must be anchored to reality in way that is deeper than the contents of what is experienced. In other words, if I can’t tell that I’m dreaming when the pink elephant offers me a cigarette, and if I can have dreams which include false awakenings, then I can’t logically ever know that I’m not dreaming. If, however, actual awakening is unmistakable as it seems, then there must be some capacity of our consciousness to know reality that extends beyond any sort of empirical symptom or logical deduction.
    • Qualia then, refers to the inarguably real experience of the color red, regardless of whether that experience is associated with the excitation of physical matter producing visible-wavelength electromagnetism in our physical eyeballs, or whether that experience is purely in our imagination. If we want to say that even imagination is surely the product of physical activity in the brain, we can make that assumption of physicalism, but now we have two completely different sources of ‘red’. They are so mechanically different, and the conversion of either one of the sources into ‘experienced red’ is so poorly understood, that all that physicalism can offer is that somehow there must be some mathematical similarity between the visible EM in the eyeball and the invisible neurochemistry scattered in many different regions of the brain which will eventually account for their apparent unity. We do not seem to be able to define a difference between red that is seen in a dream and red that is seen through our eyes, and we also are not able to define how either a brain or photon produces that quale of experienced red. The hard problem of consciousness is to imagine a reason why any such thing as experienced red exists at all, when all physical evidence points only to biochemical changes which are not red.
  • The nature of information, physical matter, and qualia.
    • Now that we have separated qualia (aesthetic-participatory presentations) from matter (scientific concept of concrete structures in public space), we can move on to understanding information. This is a very controversial subject, made more controversial by the fact that many people do not think it is controversial. There is a popular view that information is physically real, and will cite factual relationships with concepts of physical theory such as entropy. To make it more confusing, there is a separate concept of information entropy, based on the work of engineers like Claude Shannon who studied communication. Depending on how you look at it, information entropy and thermodynamic entropy can be equivalent or opposite.
    • In any case, the concept of entropy seems to blur together the behavior of physical structures and the perception of groups of structures and appearances into ‘systems’. This whole area is like intellectual quicksand, and getting ourselves out of it requires a very disciplined effort to separate different levels of sensation, perception, ‘figuration’ or identification, attention, and understanding. Because of my experience of having learned to read English as a child, I no longer have access to the raw sensation or perception level of English writing. I can’t look at these shapes on my screen and not see Latin characters and English words. Even upside down, I am still ‘informed’ by the training of my perception to read English. This would not be the case for someone who had never read English, however most adults on Earth would be able to identify the look of them as words in the English language, even though they can’t read or pronounce them. Anyone who does read English could at least try to phonetically sound out other European languages, but they may not be able to even attempt that for other languages that don’t use the Latin alphabet.
    • All of this to say that there may be no such thing as information ‘out there’. The degree to which we are ‘informed’ is limited by our capacities for both sensing and making sense. There may be no such thing as a ‘pattern’ which is separate from a conscious experience in which an aesthetic presentation is recognized as a pattern. This was a heavy revelation for me, and one which transformed my view of nature from an essentially computationalist/physicalist framework based on pattern to one based on an aesthetic-participatory framework in which nature is made of a kind of universal ‘qualia’.
    • If my view is on the right track, information does not produce qualia at all, rather information is one minimalist presentation of qualia which is perceived as having a quality of potentially ‘re-presenting’ another conscious experience. This too is a major revelation, since if true, it means that machines like computers don’t actually compute. They don’t actually input, output, or store numbers, they just serve as a physical mechanism which we use to modify our own conscious experience in a very precisely controlled way. If we unplug our monitors, nothing changes as far as the computer is concerned. If we are playing a game, the computer will continue to execute the program in total darkness. We could even plug in some kind of audio device instead of a video screen and now hear a cacophony of noises that doesn’t resemble a game at all. The information is the same from the computer’s point of view, but the change in the aesthetic presentation has made that information inaccessible to us. My hypothesis then is that perceptual access precedes information. If information is a “difference that makes a difference” then perception is the “afferent” phenomena which have to be available for an “efferent” act of comparison and recognition as “different”.
  • The assumption of emergent properties.
    • The idea that the integration of information produces qualia such as sights, sounds, and feelings depends on the idea of emergence. This idea is, in turn, is based our correlation between our conscious experience and the behavior of a brain. We have to be convinced that our conscious experience is generated by the physical matter of the brain. This alone provides us with the need to resort to a strong emergence theory of consciousness simply being a thing that brains do, or that biology does, or that complex, information integrating physical structures of any sort do (as in IIT).
    • Balanced against that is the increasing number of anomalies that suggest that the brain, while clearly having a role in how human and animal consciousness is made available, may not be a generator of consciousness. It may be the case that our particular sort of consciousness has conditioned us to prioritize the tangible, visible aspects of our experience as being the most real, but there is no logical, objective reason to assume that is true. It may be that physics and information ‘emerge’ from the way a complex conscious experience interacts with other concurrent experiences on vastly different scales. Trying to build a simulation of a brain and expecting a personal conscious experience to emerge from it may be as misguided as building a special boat to try to sail down an impossible canal in an Escher drawing.


Can Effort Be Simulated?

January 12, 2019 Leave a comment

This may seem like an odd question, but I think that it is a great one if you’re thinking about AI and the hard problem of consciousness.

Let’s say I want my dishwasher to feel the sense of effort that I feel when I wash dishes. How would I do it? It could make groaning noises or seem to procrastinate by refusing to turn on for days on end, but this would be completely pointless from a practical perspective and it would only seem like effort in my imagination. In reality, any machine can be made to perform any function that it is able to do for as long as the physical parts hold up without any effort on anyone’s part. That’s why they are machines. That’s why we replace human labor with robot labor…because it’s not really labor at all.

It is very popular to think of human beings as a kind of machine and the brain as a kind of computer, but imagine if that were really true. You could wash dishes for your entire lifetime and do nothing else. If someone wanted a house, you could simply build it for them. Machines are useful precisely because they don’t have to try to do anything. They have no sense of effort. They don’t care what they do or don’t do.

You might say, “There’s nothing special about that. Biological organisms just evolved to have this sense of effort to model physiological limits.” Ok, but what possible value would that have to survival? Under what circumstances would it serve an organism to work less than the maximum that it could physiologically? Any consideration such as conserving energy for the Winter would naturally be rolled into the maximum allowed by the regulatory systems of the body.

So, I say no. Effort cannot be simulated. Effort is not equal to energy or time. It is a feeling which is so powerful that it dictates everything that we are able to do and unable to do. Effort is a telltale sign of consciousness. If we could sleep while we do the dishes, we would, because we would not have to feel the discomfort of expending effort to do it.

Any computer, AI, or robot that would be useful to us could not possibly have a sense of its own efforts as being difficult. Once we understand how a sense of effort is truly antithetical to machine behaviors, perhaps we can then begin to see why consciousness in general cannot be simulated. How would an AI that has no sense of not wanting to do the dishes every be able to truly understand what activities are pleasurable and what are painful?

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