Multisense Realism

I have only scratched the surface here so far (it’s pretty long), but I wanted to post my comments so far. I think its a good video, and well reasoned, and gives me a good opportunity to explain why Multisense Realism is different and better than run of the mill Idealism.

The attack on idealism begins (around 22:00) by assuming that the fundamental nature of consciousness is identical to human consciousness. This would be analogous to saying that metaphysical realism is false because what is meant by reality requires that everything lacks perception, awareness, memory, etc. By setting the definition of consciousness at the high limit of its elaboration, we close the door on the much more sensible possibility of a primitive, sensory-motive basis for idealism which can augment itself into both meta-sensory capacities such as thought and personality as well as meta-insensitive capacities such as evolutionary and gravitational effects.

The properties of consciousness listed on the slide can be thought of as a spectrum of individuated aesthetic protocols which diverge rather than emerge from a single aesthetic meta-protocol, (what I call Primordial Identity Pansensitivity). In the same way that white light contains the implicit presence of each spectral color, Pansensitivity presents itself more completely through its diffraction – its incompleteness is a doorway to meta-completeness. To pick a slate of human qualities of consciousness to apply to the universe is a straw man setup. All that it shows is that non-humans are not human.

It does not show, however, that nested layers of non-human consciousness are not responsible for what we perceive as matter, planets, objects, etc. It does not mean that photons are anything other than opportunities for aesthetic acquaintance – i.e. bosons may be just how sub-biological experiences see each other. Fermions may be how low level experiences touch each other. Not ‘things’, but capacities to alienate and re-acquaint which are experienced on higher levels as mechanistic/probabilistic approximations. This may not be the argument of anyone but myself, so I can’t say whether your attack on idealism succeeds in popular forms of idealism, but I do understand what you are saying so far, and see a presumption there which you appear not to have considered.