0:51 What’s down there? 0:54 The laws of fundamental physics, quantum mechanics, 0:57 perhaps string theory below that, 0:59 perhaps a final theory of everything, 1:01 the holy grail of science. 1:04 I see a challenge to this model of how the world works. 1:08 It’s called Strong Emergence. 1:10 And it claims that each level of the hierarchy of the sciences 1:15 from physics to chemistry to biology to psychology 1:18 has its own special laws.
Right away I have problems with the assumptions being made here. Physics, chemistry, and biology may have their own special laws, but they are laws about physical, concrete, tangible phenomena, not feelings, perceptions, ideas etc. In the list “physics to chemistry to biology to psychology” one of these is not like the other. If psychology had laws, they would pertain not to organs, cells, or molecules but to aspects of conscious experience where no tangible object appears at all.
2:40 George, the claim that has been growing is that 2:44 in order to explain how everything works, 2:47 you need this concept of emergence. 2:49 Okay. Well, let’s ask the following question. 2:52 If we knew everything about what was the state of the universe 2:57 at the time of the last scattering 2:59 of the cosmic microwave background of matter. 3:02 Which is basically 14 billion years ago, 3:04 could you predict what you and I are saying 3:07 to each other today from that data? 3:09 Some of the strong physicalists believe that, that would be 3:12 the case and I think it’s absolutely clear that 3:15 there it isn’t remotely possible this would be the case, 3:18 because the fluctuations on the surface of the last scattering, 3:21 if you believe standard cosmology 3:23 or random Garcia fluctuation. 3:25 Now, out of that, emergence has taken place over time 3:28 of animals, of human beings are able to think. 3:33 And human beings then can discuss and produce books 3:36 like Einstein’s Theory of Relativity, 3:39 Darwin’s book on the origin of the species, okay. 3:42 Now, those books contain logical argumentation. 3:47 There is no way that logical argumentation was implied 3:51 in any sense by that data 3:52 on the cosmic microwave background surface. 3:55 Something has happened between there and there 3:57 which has led to that logical argumentation appearing 4:01 in the real world which it has undoubtedly has done. 4:04 On its surface, that’s correct. 4:07 But what I could do is I can throw in an evolutionary picture 4:10 and then it would develop the nervous system and the brain. 4:13 And then you have interactions between brains 4:15 and communities and I can give a story. 4:18 Yes, but the physics does not come into that story, 4:22 in any way, except facilitating what, what — 4:24 you’re bringing in a Darwinian picture. 4:26 No physics book has got Darwin’s law as a law of physics. 4:29 Sure. Sure. 4:30 No physics books has got a law, has got the Hodgkin Huxley 4:34 equations as a law of physics. 4:35 They are imagined. 4:37 But those rules or laws or understandings came out of 4:41 a mechanism of the brain that somebody came up with.
That last line is a good example of how much the idea of emergence is based on circular reasoning. To say that understanding is a mechanism of the brain assumes the conclusion that emergence is supposed to be explaining. We do not actually know that any such mechanism exists in the brain, only that we can see certain correlations between our direct experiences and our perceptions of activity in the brain through imaging devices. Any direction of causation from brain to experience is being inferred by our preference, not compelled by an understanding of how or why experiences emerge from unexperienced brains. The fact that a brain is itself a part of our experience is overlooked, as is the possibility that such images and appearances of brains could be generated by, for, and within conscious experience.
4:44 And in some ultimate analytical sense, you could describe how 4:50 those ideas came, in terms of something in the physical world. 4:53 Unless the claim is that at some levels, there is something 4:59 that is absolutely non-reducible to the physical. 5:03 The claim is that through some of the processes you indicated, 5:08 many of which are not physical, 5:10 although they’re allowed by the physics. 5:11 Brains came into being which are able to carry out 5:14 logical argumentation as an argumentation 5:17 at the psychological level. 5:19 And that argumentation is what leads to, for instance, 5:23 E to the I pi plus one is equal to zero 5:26 being written down on a piece of paper. 5:28 The physics knows absolutely nothing about that. 5:30 You have to have the emergence of the possibility 5:33 of logical argumentation to take place. 5:36 That logical argumentation then has the possibility 5:38 of controlling what appears on the piece– 5:41 So, so, okay. 5:42 But you’re not requiring anything of a non-physical 5:45 nature here at this point, or are you? 5:47 I am. An idea is a non-physical thing. 5:51 An idea is realized in the brain 5:53 but the idea itself is not a physical thing. 5:56 Okay. 5:57 Now everything we see around us here, basically, except for 6:00 the trees was designed by the human mind. 6:03 So, the mind is coarsely effective and thoughts 6:06 are coarsely effective but a thought is not a physical thing. 6:09 It’s realized in a physical way 6:10 but it is not of itself a physical thing.
At this point, I agree with George at least on one thing – that indeed ideas are not physical or reducible to the physical, unless we dilute the term physical so much that it really includes anything and becomes meaningless. I disagree, however with the assertion that “An idea is realized in the brain“. Introducing this term realized carries with it the full weight of physicalist bias, rolling right over the Explanatory Gap and Hard Problem and making the same mistake that Galileo and Locke made by pronouncing physical/extended properties “Primary” and everything else Secondary.
Physically, we see no process of realization, whatever that might mean, inside of the tissues of a brain. We see cells, fluids and molecules moving around. If we use physical instruments to bounce electromagnetic force off of the water in the brain we can read into those movements other geometric patterns of activity, but that activity, as far as science is concerned, is purely quantitative change in the way that charge/polarity is distributed. There’s nothing more likely to emerge from the Magnetic Resonance of water in the brain than any other physical property of any organ. It’s all just visual geometries overlaid onto molecular movements over time.
We now have two filler terms, emergence and realization, to smuggle in unscientific, non-explanatory fictions into physics and conscious experiences that create a false bridge between them, doing unspecified non-physical things in both directions. In reality, we have not established or explained anything, only added abstractions to hide our ignorance and make ourselves feel clever. The explanatory gap remains as dualistic as ever, with Physics, Chemistry, Biology, brains, and ‘realization’ back in the Cartesian Res Extensa realm, and Psychology, ideas, emergence, eiπ +1=0, and logical argumentation firmly in Res Cogitans.
Also mentioned by this point is the seductively innocuous term level: “at the psychological level“, “at some levels, there is something that is absolutely non-reducible to the physical.” This idea of levels is itself completely non-reducible to the physical. It is an idea about our typical ranges of perception. Physical phenomena, if they could exist independently of all detection and perception, would have no levels. Every scale from the Planck to the Cosmological would exist in the same ‘level’ and there would be no other. Physics would not get blurry vision trying to focus on a grain of sand or have to move its head to see all of the Milky Way. Everything would just exist as it is – particles unable to detect each other in any way. Nothing to aggregate or sum instantaneous events into linear time durations. Nothing to make novel geometric wholes appear (invisibly? intangibly?) from scale-dependent perceptual appearances of adjacency of parts. We all know that at the particle scale the ratio of particle to space is incredibly minute, and there is no particular reason to lump those particles together into the shapes that happen to be visible in human perception.
6:13 The idea exists and it has its own validity 6:17 but it is only realized 6:20 because of the physical things going on below? 6:23 I mean, if there’s nothing else. 6:25 Unless you’re saying that the laws of physics, 6:27 when they get to a certain level, create thing that 6:30 in principle can never be understood 6:32 by the microphysics laws. 6:34 Well, it can’t be understood. 6:35 You can’t understand E to the I pie plus one is equal to zero 6:39 in terms of maxual decrays [ph] and interacting electrons. 6:41 I think that’s pretty obvious. 6:43 You can’t understand it at that level. 6:44 You can’t understand that at that level, that’s right. 6:48 But ultimately, that’s the only way it’s realized in terms of– 6:51 No, no. That’s just the way it’s realized, yes. 6:53 So, you’ve got multiple levels. 6:55 You’ve got the atomic level. 6:57 You’ve got the molecular level, you’ve got the systems level. 6:59 All of these are simultaneously causations taking place 7:02 simultaneously, and all of them, in such a way, 7:05 that the logical thing can be worked out. 7:07 But it’s the logic which is driving what happens. 7:10 It’s the physics which enables it to happen 7:12 but the logic is deciding the outcome. 7:15 So, you have what would be downward causation? 7:19 – Downward realization. – Downward realization. 7:22 So, what’s the difference between causation 7:23 and realization? You didn’t like my word causation? 7:25 I’ve been persuaded recently, different from what I’ve written 7:28 about before, that causation is always horizontal. 7:32 Emergence is vertical, and realization is downwards. 7:35 Oh, yeah. That, that I can, I can understand that. 7:38 I’m just trying to think this out, 7:40 get me wherever you want to get me.
In this section, amidst more discussion of levels and realization are more physicalist assumptions that are treated as a priori givens: “But it’s the logic which is driving what happens. It’s the physics which enables it to happen, but the logic is deciding the outcome.” Nobody can claim to know that this is true. We know that when we observe physical phenomena and physical instruments, and then analyze those observations with certain mechanistic modes of sense-making, we can tell causality stories that make sense. We do not, however, know that what we imagine is driving those stories is the only driver of causality, or indeed if it is even correct that it is physical appearances that are doing more enabling than the non-physical appearances. If the universe were nothing but logic and physics, there would not even be a way for any part of such a universe to conceive of any alternative. Logical and physical would describe everything, so the words would be meaningless.
We do not live in a universe like that. In our universe, logic and physics are but a small portion of what we experience. If anything emerges from that, there is so much more of it that it is hard to justify seeing the physical as the realizer and the perceptual as the emergent. Even under physicalism, we literally have no experience of anything other than perceptual phenomena. If the physical objects we perceive exist beyond all perception, we will never be able to access it except as inferences from our intellect (what noumena actually refers to, etymologically).
7:42 Well, what is useful as a computer is an analog 7:46 and when a computer, for instance, sorts a list of names, 7:49 you feed in a program at the top and an algorithm 7:53 is changed down through a series of virtual machines 7:56 to the bottom level, by compilers and interpreters. 7:59 And that’s the machine language at the bottom. 8:01 The machine language does it and then it goes up again 8:03 and what you fed in at the top, results in the list 8:06 being printed out. 8:08 The electrons flowing the gates enable it to happen 8:10 but it’s the algorithm which has decided 8:12 what will, in fact, happen. 8:14 But the algorithm is represented ultimately 8:16 in terms of the transistors and… 8:19 Correct. And at this level, it’s the laws of — 8:22 it’s Maxwell’s equations, and Newton’s equations 8:24 at this level. But at this level, 8:26 it is the logic of the algorithm which is deciding 8:29 what will happen at that level and ultimately, it’s that 8:32 which decides which electrons will flow through 8:35 which gates at the bottom level. 8:36 It’s the top level decides what will be done 8:39 and the lower levels carry out the work.
At this point, the argument really loses all grounding in physics and succumbs entirely to a cartoon workflow from top level non-physical algorithms to bottom level physical semiconductor components and back. All of these claims are false:
“that’s the machine language at the bottom“ “it’s the algorithm which has decided“ “But the algorithm is represented ultimately in terms of the transistors“
Any sort of language is a feature of how we understand and communicate consciously. Physics, if it could exist independently of consciousness, would not need a language, it has fundamental forces and statistically inevitable recombinations to do all of the ‘deciding’. Electromagnetism, not algorithms, are opening or closing gates. Transistors can have no inkling of any grand logic inscribed by human programmers in some non-physical never-never layer. They don’t need logic.
Microphysical behavior is the same regardless of whether or not they are grouped together in some semiotic schema. Those behaviors – which are nothing but the movement of particles relative to each other, do not represent anything. They are not terms in an algorithmic language. The machine components have no access to any other level or layer. Their presence is a purely tangible-haptic geometric-dynamic fact. Not only would other levels have no functional role in influencing electromagnetism, electromagnetism has no physical way to be influenced by them. It’s the interaction problem of Dualism. The only ghosts in the machine that physics allows are physical ghosts like charge, mass, and spin. Nothing physical is summing them up or transforming them into non-physical ‘seemings’.
As far as the connection between Machine language and Machine goes, I have discussed here why it does not survive causal closure, and is in fact just another infinitely broad explanatory gap between abstract logical concepts and concrete physical objects.
8:41 So, let me ask this question. 8:43 We know the H2O is water. 8:45 If I gave you some gas of hydrogen, 8:47 gas of oxygen and hydrogen, could you ever predict 8:50 that if you got a lot of it together, it would be wet? 8:53 No. The answer is no, you can’t. 8:55 This is one of the problems with– 8:57 Okay. So, I think there are people who say that you can. 9:00 Well, alright. Let me, let me– 9:01 Because you — when you know that the angle 9:03 between the hydrogen and the oxygen, 9:05 then you can put a lot together, you can see how they would slip, 9:07 and how wetness could occur. 9:09 There is a great problem in deriving the macro properties 9:12 of waters from the micro properties. 9:13 But let me make the following statement. 9:15 By the time you’ve done that, the hydrogen atom 9:18 no longer exists as a hydrogen atom. 9:20 It only exists as a water molecule. 9:22 So, the lower level no longer exists 9:24 as the individual entities. 9:25 They’ve got incorporated at a higher-level interchange. 9:27 Okay. But if you knew everything about 9:29 the hydrogen and the oxygen you should be able to predict 9:32 the wetness of water if you have it in groups? 9:35 You should. In the case of water, in principle, absolutely. 9:38 You can do that.
This popular example of emergence is another example of circular reasoning fouling up our understanding. What we experience as water has different aspects – in the visible sense, we see images of familiar blue colors, transparency, and shapes like waves and droplets, clouds, mist, etc. In the aural sense, we hear familiar splashing and bubbling, tidal waves crashing, sounds of pouring and spilling onto solid matter. There are flavors and odors that we associate with water also. All of these qualities can and are experienced regularly in ordinary dreams and imagination. If this is water, it is not physical.
H2O refers not to the water that we experience, but to a molecular arrangement that makes sense to us intellectually within the context of chemistry that can be applied to accurately predict and control many of the experiences in our waking consciousness of physical qualities. These are not necessarily different from dream qualities, as dreams can be quite exhaustively realistic, even under deliberate lucid inspection, however we can agree that while we are awake, our experiences of the physical world appear to us to have characteristics that *certainly must* separate it from mere dreams. Of course, during dreams, our waking experience may not be accessible at all, and we often have no way to doubt the reality of the dream, even if the contents appear to be floridly surreal by comparison with typical states of waking experience.
When we think more carefully about the relationship of H2O to wetness, there is nothing that suggests an emergence relationship, or a bottom-top flow of causality or morphology. Wetness is a tactile sensation. It can appear in a dream. H2O is an intellectual concept. It too can appear in a dream. What H2O is supposed to describe, if it could exist independently of consciousness, would not be wet at any scale. It would not constellate into novel geometries of visible appearance or tangible splashiness. H2O refers to a hypothetical, noumenal phenomenon that has no need for levels of emergence or realization, and no physical theory tells us how or why any of that would be physically conjured into existence. Again, the explanatory gap between noumenal molecular objects and any sort of wetness, image, sound, flavor or smell that we call water is infinitely wide. Nothing that happens in a brain sheds any light on this gap. We remain forever on the phenomenal side of it.
9:39 So, the question is, is the water example different 9:41 than your other examples? 9:42 Absolutely, because in the other cases, 9:45 there’s logical stuff going on at that level — 9:48 well, let me go back to that computer example. 9:50 Exactly the same logic gets re-written 9:53 at each of those levels. 9:54 It gets written in Fortran, it gets re-written in Java. 9:57 It’s written in Assembly. 9:58 Gets re-written in machine language. 10:00 And then, it gets incorporated into physical systems. 10:04 The logic is still the thing that is driving everything. 10:08 And the logic does get embodied in the lower level structures, 10:11 they are realizing it, but the thing that is driving it 10:14 is an abstract entity of the logic.Simple vs Weak Emergence 10:18 KUHN: This is Strong Emergence in its full-throated defense. 10:22 George is its apostle. 10:25 And I learned to distinguish Strong Emergence 10:28 from Simple or Weak Emergence. 10:31 The latter is the idea that radically different properties 10:34 in science, can, with deeper knowledge 10:36 of the underlying physics, be explained, 10:39 like the wetness of water. 10:41 Everyone signs on to Simple or Weak Emergence. 10:44 It’s not controversial.What is Strong Emergence 10:48 But Strong Emergence would be an astonishing thing. 10:51 Utterly transformative. 10:53 A new radical way of how the world works. 10:58 Could human logic, 11:00 at the highest macro level in our minds, 11:02 drive the physics at the lowest micro level in our brains? 11:07 Even though human logic itself is composed of nothing 11:10 but that same microphysics in our brains. 11:13 It sounds circular, mysterious, yet I’d be hard pressed 11:18 to name a more axial question in the physical world. 11:23 That’s why I subject Strong Emergence to strong critique 11:27 and here at the Crete conference, 11:29 I have no trouble finding strong critics.
This is a bit of reiteration of the previous examples, which I have addressed already. The logical leap is hidden between these lines:
“9:58 Gets re-written in machine language. 10:00 And then, it gets incorporated into physical systems.“
“Gets incorporated?” How? Physically? This is pure metaphor. The machine language is for our understanding. It has no causal power to manifest electromagnetic changes in a semiconductor. No, the only thing that gets incorporated into physical systems is voltage. Nothing is being written or read, just zapped electrostatically. Human hands are making the hardware that make that happen, not telepathic minds or software language. Nothing is being realized except in our imagination and perception. The emoji is not realized by code, but by a video display and human visual perception.
Moving on to the next interview in the video with David Albert, the assumptions of physicalism are even more explicit. His argument is summed up as follows:
13:29 And yes, I think that a sort of idea that the world 13:34 can potentially be reduced to a set of fundamental mechanical 13:38 phenomena in order to defend the sanctity of human life 13:43 or something like that, the specialness of consciousness, 13:46 the death of this project has been announced. 13:49 And those announcements have always turned out 13:52 to be premature.
This is not a philosophically persuasive argument. As many philosophers have pointed out, using scientific methods designed to specifically disqualify and remove non-physical qualities cannot be expected to have the same validity when deployed against physical phenomena as non- or trans-physical phenomena. It is like someone poking out their eyes and saying that they have been successful in navigating the world ever since using their other senses, so they are sure that color and image will turn out not to be visible either.
The expectation of material science eventually providing reductionistic explanations of immaterial appearances is what I like to call the fallacy of pseudo-credulity. It’s a betrayal of the very scientific spirit that it purports to champion.
In the next interview with Barry Loewer, the position is laid out as follows:
21:57 Strong Emergence says there’s something that happens, 21:59 in some sense, in the physical world, 22:01 that as you go up a level, 22:03 the laws of physics at the lowest levels will, 22:05 in principle, not be able to make that jump 22:08 to that level of biology. 22:11 That is right. I think that the weight of reason 22:14 is on the side of they can make the jump. 22:17 And here’s the reason I’m saying that. 22:19 That if the jump couldn’t be made, 22:21 then there must be some ways in which 22:24 the microphysical world evolves, 22:26 which can’t be accounted for in terms of microphysics. 22:29 And the reason for that is that any change in the world 22:33 at a macroscopic level, let’s say that involved biology 22:36 or psychology, could itself make for a change at the micro level.
Here again psychology is lumped in with physics and biology, completely ignoring the explanatory gap and assuming a difference in degree rather than the difference in kind that we experience directly. There is no level of brain activity that is psychological. Microphysical states cannot be assumed to jump from geometric states of tangible objects/particles to intangible states like percepts or concepts. If such a jump could exist, there is no good reason to justify calling that jump physical.
24:05 I think if causation as just evolving truths like — 24:08 look, if the psychological event hadn’t occurred, 24:12 then the physical event wouldn’t have occurred. 24:14 So, if you hadn’t thought about elephants, 24:17 you wouldn’t have waved your hand like that. 24:19 And there’s also a physical counterfactual. 24:22 If such and such had not gone on in your brain, 24:24 you wouldn’t have waved your hand like that. 24:25 And these are perfectly compatible with each other
The last line here exposes the fallacy. While neurological processes and psychological experiences can seem perfectly compatible with each other, that sense of compatibility is purely psychological, not physical. That’s a problem if we’re asserting physical reduction of causality. We lose the very parsimony that physical reduction explanations require to validate itself.
At the very end, Robert Kuhn at least touches on other possibilities.
25:15 If fundamental physics would be forever not capable 25:18 of explaining biology or psychology or anything else, 25:22 if that reduction could not ever be made, then one must conclude 25:27 that there are mechanisms by which the microworld evolves 25:31 which cannot be accounted for in terms of physics. 25:37 Is this a contradiction? 25:40 Yes, if reality is confined to the physical, 25:44 but there is no contradiction 25:46 if one dares venture beyond the known physical world.
That’s where panpsychism, nondualism and my own multisense realism come in…
Which is more likely?
Isn’t saying that consciousness is an emergent property of the brain just as much a non-explanation as saying it is a fundamental property of all matter?
To begin with, I think that it is necessary to separate the notion of personal states of consciousness from the vastly more general phenomenon of awareness.
Despite continuing evidence that human beings are less unique and special compared to other species than we had believed in the past, there are still ways in which Homo sapiens exhibit superlative talents. While we may no longer be able to point to any one particular trait, such as tool use, language use, or bipedalism that makes humans fundamentally different from everything else in the universe, the overwhelming sophistication of human life is surely an order of magnitude greater than that of any other organism we have encountered.
We know now that human neurons are not very different from those of other species, however, the human brain has almost twice the ratio of brain to body mass and energy of expenditure than the next closest contender (Bottlenose dolphin). We have every reason to correlate this surplus brain capacity with the success of the human species in overcoming their natural limitations and extending their habitat in uniquely un-natural ways.
If we set aside the special case of human consciousness for a moment, what can we really say that a brain does for an organism which cannot be found in organisms which lack a brain that has to do with deciding whether that organism is aware or not? There are zooplankton, for instance, with no brains who have eyes made of just two cells. We can imagine that anything using such primitive sense organs would have a vastly degraded experience compared to stereoscopic human vision, but the general premise of using optical sensation to navigate the environment is no more or less an indication of consciousness than our own.
As neuroscience and biology progress, it seems that rather than finding a clear threshold of phenomena which begin to appear more conscious, the threshold continues to fall. Here are some interesting things to consider:
Add to this the continuing lack of resolution on ‘fringe’ issues such as NDEs, OBE’s, paranormal phenomena, the increase of the placebo effect, statistical anomalies in random event generators (REGs) and we get a picture of consciousness emerging from brains as seeming awfully anthropocentric.
If we consider the possibility of a material panpsychism, in which consciousness is a property of matter, it is not clear that we have solved the fundamental problem. The so called Hard Problem of Consciousness and Explanatory Gap address this lack of understanding about what a phenomenal quality of aesthetic presence would be doing in a mechanistic universe in the first place. By focusing on the structure of the brain and function of neurons, we are hoping to deflate the mind body problem. The mind can be seen simply as the functioning of a neural body – a vast network which exploits biochemistry to represent computations in this as-yet-not-understood, but inevitably discoverable way we are familiar with as our naive experience.
If we look at this approach more closely however, I think that we should find that all we have done is to miniaturize the mind body problem, so that it now exists at an arbitrary scale (neuron-mind neuron-body, peptide-mind peptide-body, connectome-mind connectome body, etc.). The metaphor of hardware and software has, in my view, led a generation of cognitive scientists and consciousness enthusiasts down a misguided path in which the very systems which we use to serve our conscious user experience (screen, keyboard, GUI, software) are mistakenly identified as serving the hardware (CPU, RAM, storage, network).
To truly go beyond the hard problem requires that we look at ‘looking’ itself. Understanding sensation and awareness as a phenomenon in its own right requires that we suspend all previous judgments and delve into completely new directions. In my own hypothesis, I see consciousness as not only a property of matter or physics, but is the sole property from which all possible properties must extend. This doesn’t require a human-like deity any more than the belief in matter requires that the universe is a large human-like body. It is more a matter of understanding how nested symmetries of a primordial sensitivity could produce what we know as matter, energy, spacetime, information, and subjective experience.
I have been using the term ‘aesthetic’ a lot lately in specifying the qualitative aspects of consciousness, and I feel like it clarifies one of the core issues. The Hard Problem of Consciousness is confusing to people whose mindset is innately compelled to define consciousness as a collection of functions in the first place. It therefore comes out nonsensical when philosophers like David Chalmers talk about questioning why there is such a thing as ‘what it is like’ to have an experience, since for the functionalist, ‘what it is like’ to perform a function is simply the self-same set of events which comprise the function.
Maybe it helps to define ‘what it is like’ in more specific terms, which I think would be scientifically described as private sensory-motive participation but informally can be understood as aesthetic phenomena. The key is to notice the asymmetric relation between aesthetics and function in that function can improve aesthetics, but aesthetics can *never* improve function. The Hard Problem then becomes a problem of how to explain aesthetics (aka qualia) in a universe of functions which can neither benefit by them nor physically generate them as far as we can tell (unless there is a miniature kitchen near our olfactory bulbs baking microscopic apple pies whenever we remember the smell of apple pie).
The fact that aesthetics are not possible to explain in terms of a function, but that functions can be conceived of aesthetically is unfamiliar and those who have that innately functional mindset will balk at the notion of aesthetic supremacy, but this is the future of science – letting go of the familiar, or in this case, rediscovering the literally familiar (ordinary consciousness) in an unfamiliar way (as the fabric of existence).
When we talk about consciousness then, what we really mean is the aesthetic experience of being and doing, of perceiving and participating. This experience is extended publicly as spatio-temporal form-functions (STFF), but those phenomena are not capable of appreciating themselves. Just as a puppet can be made to seem to walk and talk like a person, forms can be made to interact by hijacking their natural low-level aesthetics to represent our high-level expectations. The letters on this screen are just such an example. I am using a lot of technology to generate contrasting pixels on your video screen, which you will experience as letters, words, and sentences.
Each level of description – as typeface, spellings, grammars, evoke aesthetic micro-experiences. The closer these descriptions get to your native scale – the personal scale, the more that your personal experience, feelings, and understanding influences the aesthetics of all of the sub-personal experiences within reading the language. What you see of the letters is because of your experience of learning to read English, not because of any special power that these words have to project meaning. By themselves, these words and letters do nothing to each other. They are figures for use in human communication – they have no functional aspect, i.e. they are *only* aesthetic. This is why a computer has no use for human languages, or even programming languages. Computation requires no figures or forms of any kind, nor can it produce any forms or figures without borrowing some kind of STFF (with u in the middle, heh) from the ‘real world’. Otherwise there is a only the anesthetic concept of pure function – which is the exact opposite of representation by form, image, or quality, but is non-presentation through quantity.
Computation, or ‘Information Processing’ is the unconscious number crunching of automated, logical functionality. Information lacks aesthetic presence by definition – it is a purely conceptual understanding of instructed variables in motion. If there is a capacity for aesthetic appreciation to begin with, then computation can extend it and improve it. If there is no such capacity, then there is certainly no justification for adding it into computation, as automatic function cannot benefit in any way by appreciation of its own activity.
One of the most significant intellectual errors educated persons make is in underestimating the fallibility of science. The very best scientific theories containing our soundest, most reliable knowledge are certain to be superseded, recategorized from “right” to “wrong”; they are, as physicist David Deutsch says, misconceptions:
I have often thought that the nature of science would be better understood if we called theories “misconceptions” from the outset, instead of only after we have discovered their successors. Thus we could say that Einstein’s Misconception of Gravity was an improvement on Newton’s Misconception, which was an improvement on Kepler’s. The neo-Darwinian Misconception of Evolution is an improvement on Darwin’s Misconception, and his on Lamarck’s… Science claims neither infallibility nor finality.
This fact comes as a surprise to many; we tend to think of science —at the point of conclusion, when it becomes knowledge— as being more or less infallible and certainly final. Science, indeed, is the sole area of human investigation whose reports we take seriously to the point of crypto-objectivism. Even people who very much deny the possibility of objective knowledge step onto airplanes and ingest medicines. And most importantly: where science contradicts what we believe or know through cultural or even personal means, we accept science and discard those truths, often enough wisely.
An obvious example: the philosophical problem of free will. When Newton’s misconceptions were still considered the exemplar of truth par excellence, the very model of knowledge, many philosophers felt obliged to accept a kind of determinism with radical implications. Give the initial-state of the universe, it appeared, we should be able to follow all particle trajectories through the present, account for all phenomena through purely physical means. In other words: the chain of causation from the Big Bang on left no room for your volition:
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Determinism in the West is often associated with Newtonian physics, which depicts the physical matter of the universe as operating according to a set of fixed, knowable laws. The “billiard ball” hypothesis, a product of Newtonian physics, argues that once the initial conditions of the universe have been established, the rest of the history of the universe follows inevitably. If it were actually possible to have complete knowledge of physical matter and all of the laws governing that matter at any one time, then it would be theoretically possible to compute the time and place of every event that will ever occur (Laplace’s demon). In this sense, the basic particles of the universe operate in the same fashion as the rolling balls on a billiard table, moving and striking each other in predictable ways to produce predictable results.
Thus: the movement of the atoms of your body, and the emergent phenomena that such movement entails, can all be physically accounted for as part of a chain of merely physical, causal steps. You do not “decide” things; your “feelings” aren’t governing anything; there is no meaning to your sense of agency or rationality. From this essentially unavoidable philosophical position, we are logically-compelled to derive many political, moral, and cultural conclusions. For example: if free will is a phenomenological illusion, we must deprecate phenomenology in our philosophies; it is the closely-clutched delusion of a faulty animal; people, as predictable and materially reducible as commodities, can be reckoned by governments and institutions as though they are numbers. Freedom is a myth; you are the result of a process you didn’t control, and your choices aren’t choices at all but the results of laws we can discover, understand, and base our morality upon.
I should note now that (1) many people, even people far from epistemology, accept this idea, conveyed via the diffusion of science and philosophy through politics, art, and culture, that most of who you are is determined apart from your will; and (2) the development of quantum physics has not in itself upended the theory that free will is an illusion, as the sorts of indeterminacy we see among particles does not provide sufficient room, as it were, for free will.
Of course, few of us can behave for even a moment as though free will is a myth; there should be no reason for personal engagement with ourselves, no justification for “trying” or “striving”; one would be, at best, a robot-like automaton incapable of self-control but capable of self-observation. One would account for one’s behaviors not with reasons but with causes; one would be profoundly divested from outcomes which one cannot affect anyway. And one would come to hold that, in its basic conception of time and will, the human consciousness was totally deluded.
As it happens, determinism is a false conception of reality. Physicists like David Deutsch and Ilya Prigogine have, in my opinion, defended free will amply on scientific grounds; and the philosopher Karl Popper described how free will is compatible in principle with a physicalist conception of the universe; he is quoted by both scientists, and Prigogine begins his book The End of Certainty, which proposes that determinism is no longer compatible with science, by alluding to Popper:
Earlier this century in The Open Universe: An Argument for Indeterminism, Karl Popper wrote,” Common sense inclines, on the one hand, to assert that every event is caused by some preceding events, so that every event can be explained or predicted… On the other hand, … common sense attributes to mature and sane human persons… the ability to choose freely between alternative possibilities of acting.” This “dilemma of determinism,” as William James called it, is closely related to the meaning of time. Is the future given, or is it under perpetual construction?
Prigogine goes on to demonstrate that there is, in fact, an “arrow of time,” that time is not symmetrical, and that the future is very much open, very much compatible with the idea of free will. Thus: in our lifetimes we have seen science —or parts of the scientific community, with the rest to follow in tow— reclassify free will from “illusion” to “likely reality”; the question of your own role in your future, of humanity’s role in the future of civilization, has been answered differently just within the past few decades.
No more profound question can be imagined for human endeavor, yet we have an inescapable conclusion: our phenomenologically obvious sense that we choose, decide, change, perpetually construct the future was for centuries contradicted falsely by “true” science. Prigogine’s work and that of his peers —which he calls a “probabilizing revolution” because of its emphasis on understanding unstable systems and the potentialities they entail— introduces concepts that restore the commonsensical conceptions of possibility, futurity, and free will to defensibility.
If one has read the tortured thinking of twentieth-century intellectuals attempting to unify determinism and the plain facts of human experience, one knows how submissive we now are to the claims of science. As Prigogine notes, we were prepared to believe that we, “as imperfect human observers, [were] responsible for the difference between past and future through the approximations we introduce into our description of nature.” Indeed, one has the sense that the more counterintuitive the scientific claim, the eagerer we are to deny our own experience in order to demonstrate our rationality.
This is only degrees removed from ordinary orthodoxies. The point is merely that the very best scientific theories remain misconceptions, and that where science contradicts human truths of whatever form, it is rational to at least contemplate the possibility that science has not advanced enough yet to account for them; we must be pragmatic in managing our knowledge, aware of the possibility that some truths we intuit we cannot yet explain, while other intuitions we can now abandon.
It is vital to consider how something can be both true and not in order to understand science and its limitations, and even more the limitations of second-order sciences (like social sciences). Newton’s laws were incredible achievements of rationality, verified by all technologies and analyses for hundreds of years, before their unpredicted exposure as deeply flawed ideas applied to a limited domain which in total provide incorrect predictions and erroneous metaphorical structures for understanding the universe.
I never tire of quoting Karl Popper’s dictum:
Whenever a theory appears to you as the only possible one, take this as a sign that you have neither understood the theory nor the problem which it was intended to solve.
It is hard but necessary to have this relationship with science, whose theories seem like the only possible answers and whose obsolescence we cannot imagine. A rational person in the nineteenth century would have laughed at the suggestion that Newton was in error; he could not have known about the sub-atomic world or the forces and entities at play in the world of general relativity; and he especially could not have imagined how a theory that seemed utterly, universally true and whose predictive and explanatory powers were immense could still be an incomplete understanding, revealed by later progress to be completely mistaken about nearly all of its claims.
Can you imagine such a thing? It will happen to nearly everything you know. Consider what “ignorance” and “knowledge” really are for a human, what you can truly know, how you should judge others given this overwhelming epistemological instability!
That’s a great article, IMO. He hits a lot of points dead on that I have tried many times to make in many different debates.
The only point of contention I might have is the idea of scientific paradigms being misconceptions rather than conceptions. It makes sense as far as it provides a good provocation for an audience, but if we were really being absolutely scientific about it, I would say that misconception has too much of a dismissive connotation. If it turns out that the Earth is actually a four dimensional shadow of a 19 dimensional interplanetary being, that doesn’t make our perceptions of the Sol-centric orbiting orb or the Jerusalem-centric flat garden misconceptions…but it does make the latter model a misconception *in comparison to the former*.
But yes, for the purposes of the waking up the average humdrum mind, the point is well made that we would all be well advised to keep in mind that odds are that everything we know is wrong, on some level or in some sense. That seems to be more important now than it usually does. Some moments in history appear to be more polarizing than others.
“the chain of causation from the Big Bang on left no room for your volition”
This is still the overwhelmingly popular assumption, in my experience.
“Of course, few of us can behave for even a moment as though free will is a myth; there should be no reason for personal engagement with ourselves, no justification for “trying” or “striving”; one would be, at best, a robot-like automaton incapable of self-control but capable of self-observation. One would account for one’s behaviors not with reasons but with causes; one would be profoundly divested from outcomes which one cannot affect anyway. And one would come to hold that, in its basic conception of time and will, the human consciousness was totally deluded.”
I have tried many times to communicate this exactly. Great way of pulling it together. I think that the fact that what he is saying is true gives us the vantage point from which to see that “trying” or “striving” is an aesthetic quality of intention which is actually perpendicular or orthomodular physical principle to the axis of the unintentional. As the privacy of physics is a spectrum of effort, courage, tenacity, boldness, surrender, release, etc, the public side of physics is monotonous: anesthetic, automatic qualities which describe a continuum between determinism and ‘accident’ (/error/random/mutation). Of course, it is only because we can alter our own degree of intentionality that we can discern between determinism and accident; were the universe plotted only on that single unintentional axis, that chain of causation, then there could be no conceivable difference between accident and non-accident. It is ironically our own distance from automatism which gives us the impression that automatism is rich enough to exist as a monopole.
“It is vital to consider how something can be both true and not in order to understand science and its limitations,”
Stealing that.
I’m generally in full agreement with everything here. He might be a bit more optimistic than I am about the current state of what is accepted by scientists and science buffs at this point. I feel that the mechanistic worldview is not going to die that easily. If this revolution does get off the ground, it could very well be another brief renaissance before being subsumed into the next revival of anesthetic totalism.
Emergent properties can only exist within conscious experience.
…
Neither matter nor information can ‘seem to be’ anything. They are what they are.
It makes more sense that existence itself is an irreducibly sensory-motive phenomenon – an aesthetic presentation with scale-dependent anesthetic appearances rather than a mass-energetic structure or information processing function. Instead of consciousness (c) arising as an unexplained addition to an unconscious, non-experienced universe (u) of matter and information (mi), material and informative appearances arise as from the spatiotemporal nesting (dt) of conscious experiences that make up the universe.
Materialism: c = u(mdt) + c
Computationalism: c = u(idt) + c
Multisense Realism: u(midt) = c(c)/~!c.
For all dangerous minds, your own, or ours, but not the tv shows'... ... ... ... ... ... ... How to hack human consciousness, How to defend against human-hackers, and anything in between... ... ... ... ... ...this may be regarded as a sort of dialogue for peace and plenty for a hungry planet, with no one left behind, ever... ... ... ... please note: It may behoove you more to try to prove to yourselves how we may really be a time-traveler, than to try to disprove it... ... ... ... ... ... ...Enjoy!
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