Multisense Realism

Here are my comments on the part of this 4h31m long discussion that focuses explicitly on the Hard Problem, 03:05:19 – 03:43:24

I feel compelled to begin with a disclaimer that I think that I respect the group of people in this trialogue, their intelligence and expertise, and I am fully aware that my views come from a somewhat outsidered perspective, but in all cases my motive is not to deny any scientific observation or posit any sort of magic beyond the near-omnipotence of what I propose that consciousness actually is – which is something like imagination on a cosmological scale. I fully respect the academic credentials of the participants as well, and while I never pursued that path farther than a BA degree in Anthropology, I prefer to use first names rather than Dr. titles – no offense or undue familiarity intended, just seems less pretentious. Speaking of pretentious, I hereby end this disclaimer and proceed to the proceedings.

The Hard Problem segment opens with Joscha bringing up Daniel Dennett, and how his dismissal of qualia seems to be based on a criticism of how the term is used in philosophy. In the course of that, JB says of Dennett’s position…

3:06:46 “Oh well he’s a functionalist. Pretty much standard.

He says…uh good writing…there’s nothing wrong with what he writes. My position might be different from yours because I don’t see magical powers that are afforded by biology, it’s still just function. It is provided by biology and I can break down these functions ultimately into state transitions in substrates that form control structure and so on, so it’s it’s not opening avenues into something new. There’s basically no magical homunculus that is produced in consciousness via biology. Biology is just a way to get self-organizing matter.”

Here I agree with Joscha completely. I disagree with Dennett’s views almost entirely, but have great respect for how he does what he does. As far as biology goes, I see no grounds for emergent properties, especially any that smell of consciousness. When JB says that he can break down biological functions into mechanical events, I tend to believe him, or at least understand why that is entirely possible in theory. While we perceive breakpoints in the properties of physical, chemical, and biological phenomena, they are as far as I can reason, aesthetic separations. Functionally, they all refer to the same thing: concrete tangible objects on different scales of size moving each other around and changing shapes.

The geometry of those shapes and their movements become more complicated as we scale up in size from particles to molecules to cells to bodies, but complication in and of itself adds nothing to the conversation about consciousness. Indeed, without some awareness and experience, molecules or cells have no way of suspecting that they are part of any group or process and no capacity to qualify it as simple or complex. Without a theory of sense, we are really at a loss to say what the difference would be between matter and nothingness, but that’s another topic. Without going that far, I would still say that even the idea of ‘control systems’ can only arise within a conscious experience where a thoughtful analysis of perceived objects in a universe where some objects are associated with conscious, teleological motives.

In the most stringent reading of the view that I propose, matter of any scale would not literally be controlling anything, so that any appearance of control is smuggled in by our conscious, anthropic experience. Without that anthropomorphic projection, what we see as bacteria or molecules controlling each other would reduce losslessly to non-purposeful habits of mindless physical force geometry. Saying that these movements of objects are control systems doesn’t actually add anything to what is occurring physically, but that isn’t key to understanding the Hard Problem. We can call what physical structures end up doing mechanically ‘control systems’ without taking that literally. Literally there’s just physical forces moving each other around automatically for no reason other than the given geometry of what they are. If what we mean by “self-organizing” implies something more than inevitable looping geometries of those automatic movements, then that too would fall into an Explanatory Gap.

I agree with what Joscha says next about the problem that I and many others have with Daniel Dennett’s disqualifications of qualia:

3:07:56 JB: “…what I found is that Dennett fails to convince a lot of his own students in some sense and I try to figure out why that is and the best explanation that I’ve come up with so far is that Dennett actually never explains phenomenal experience. And when discusses qualia he mostly points at definitional defects in the way in which most philosophers treat qualia and then says it’s probably something that doesn’t really exist in the way in which these people Define it so we also don’t need to explain it and a lot of people find this unsatisfying. Because they say that regardless of how you define it it’s clearly something that they experience like qualia being the atoms of phenomenal experience or aspects of phenomenal experience or features of phenomenal experience it doesn’t really matter how you define it it’s there right and please explain it to me because I don’t see how an unthinking and feeling Mechanical Universe is going to produce these wealth of experience that I’m confronted with and so this physics does not seem to be able to explain why something is happening to me why is me here why is their experience and this is something that some people feel is poorly addressed by Dennett.”

Joscha goes on to summarize the significance of Philosophical Zombie thought experiments in formulating the Hard Problem.

3:09:45 JB …”so let’s see, we have a philosophical zombie in front of us and we are asking this philosophic zombie who in every regard acts like a human being because his brain implements all the necessary functionality just mechanically and not magically, ‘are you conscious?’ what is the zombie going to respond?

Anastasia Bendebury “What do you what do you mean about the fact that the brain reproduces all of the effects?”

JB: “The idea of the philosophical zombie is that the philosophical zombie is producing everything without giving rise to phenomenal experience – just mechanical. Based on the intuition that…”

AB: “What does that mean? I don’t understand what that means.”

JB: “I think the intuition is that when we experience is something that cannot be explained through causal structure. So mechanisms.”

AB: “But why do we think that? I don’t understand why we possibly think that.

That’s what I mean about not understanding the hard problem of Consciousness. Because I’m like look… This is why my definition of life as beginning before the cell is instrumental to eliminating the hard problem of Consciousness. Because if you have in the most basic cell – which is an embodiment of the state of matter that is life – you have a resonant state which is electromagnetic. It’s the redox state.

And the cell needs to maintain that electrical resonance at a specific set point because if it does not, it dies. And so it is going out into the world and it is constantly controlling where it is in the world relative to its internal state. And as you progressively produce more and more complex beings you get a more and more complex map of the world and a more and more complex internal state. And so by the time that you have a walking human, you cannot have a walking human without an internal state. It’s a philosophical thought experiment that requires you to divorce yourself from everything that you know about biology in order to make the claim. And I just feel like you can’t do that!

Because the biology is inherently what produces the conscious…it’s the state of matter that produces the consciousness and all of the resonant waves that are inside of it. And so if you have the resonant waves in the sufficient complexity of a sufficiently resonant system that is interpreting the world relative to itself and to what it wants how can you have anything except for consciousness? You have experience, you have the mapping of expectation to frustration and you’re just…it just emerges from the most basic cell.

I think that the reason why Anastasia isn’t seeing the Hard Problem is because her model of biology already includes aesthetic-participatory phenomena (experience, awareness, sensory-motivation), rather than cells being anesthetic-automatic mechanical events that occur independently of any experience of them.

The expectation that a physical state like reduction–oxidation (redox) constitutes or leads to a cell’s need to participate intentionally in seeking to correct what it somehow senses (unexplained by biology) as disequilibrium is already smuggling in teleology into biochemistry > physics > mechanism.

Because we have genetic mutation and retrospective statistical natural/passive “selection” to account for the evolving mechanical behaviors of cells, no sense or teleology is needed in the explanation. We can omit it entirely and nothing changes in our description of what is causing the movements of cells in the direction of the chemical reactions that are necessarily pulling them there.

In a purely physical universe, chemistry would act not out of any perceived sense of need. There would be no agentic power to seek out satiation of that need, but rather the mechanical behaviors that end up maintaining redox states (unperceived) would be nothing but those behaviors that happen to have survived in the genetics of the cell. If the cell ends up moving in ways that maintain redox and happens to be in an environment that allows that to happen, then the cell has a better statistical chance of reproducing. That’s it. No need, no going out into a world, no controlling, no sense of self – just molecular geometry cashing itself out statistically over time.

JB: “How do resonant waves produce consciousness?”

AB: “say it again”

JB: “How do resonant waves produce consciousness?”

AB: “okay so do you know the Qualia Research Institute yes? So what is their work? Their work is that they’re basically showing that there are harmonic states in the brain that are associated with experience”

It’s important to realize, in my opinion, that the association is always coming from experience, not from anything the brain is doing. The association is retrospective from the reality of consciousness rather than prospective from the reality of unexperienced brain matter.

Michael Shilo DeLay: “The question seems akin to asking how do fundamental waves produce music? Which emerges from all of these individual tones. But the same thing with conscious experiences you have the summing of different modules within the neuron-based systems that are all aggregating and fighting and resonating with one another and you get music that comes out of it.”

JB: “And you don’t see an explanatory problem there? No?

AB: “No. I’m like how I mean I can see a mathematical problem. I can see that it would be very very difficult to mathematize the way that that resonance…”

Here I see that what is being overlooked is the gap between phenomena in one sense modality (waving intensities of chemical or electrochemical movements in a brain) and any other aesthetic quality (sights, sounds, feelings, etc). When we understand music as emerging from a sequence of aural tones, that’s all within the context of a conscious experience. Sound in the aural sense is qualia. Sound waves are actually silent acoustic perturbations of matter as it collides with matter. Between the concept we have of sound waves, which refer to dynamic geometry of tangible objects so firmly embedded in our learning, we overlook the need to explain how and why these movements of matter are perceived at all, and how they come to be perceived as sounds rather than as the silent, physical vibrations of substances that they ‘actually’ are.

In comparing music emerging from acoustic waves to consciousness emerging from brain wave resonance, we are already falling for the same circular reasoning fallacy that leads people to deny the Hard Problem. Since there is the same Hard Problem there in transducing tangible changes in objects to aural experiences of sound, notes, and music, it actually only reinforces the Hard Problem in the brain > consciousness context. Sense is the key. That’s why I write so much about it and call my view Multisense Realism.

For the next few minutes the hosts and guest discuss the limits of the explanatory power of math, language, and scientific theory, and the difference between explanation and description. This isn’t directly related to the Hard Problem in my opinion, but it does speak to the same theme of neglecting different modalities of sense and sense making and glossing over the fact that in all cases, the gaps between such modalities can only be filled, as far as we can conceive, by some conscious experience in which multiple modes of qualia can be accessed and manipulated intentionally in another mode of sense making (imagination, abstraction, understanding). Because Anastasia’s view of the Hard Problem is that it must come from a misunderstanding of biology (which she already gives experience and teleology to), she sees the Problem as one of finding fault with description for not being explanatory.

I agree with Joscha in his response:

3:18:07 So when you talk about harmonic waves producing a phenomenon for me that’s very far from a causal explanation that so it’s something that is very unsatisfying to me because I cannot build this but well for me a causal explanation is something I can make.

This is at the heart of the Explanatory Gap, which I like to meme-ify with this cannibalized version of a cartoon (not sure which artist I stole the original from, but my apologies):

Following this, Joscha gets into a detailed technical explanation of what waves are and why they don’t explain or justify producing phenomenal qualities.

3:20:02 JB: “…you can build control systems and once you have control systems you can also build control systems that don’t just regulate the present but also regulate the future, but in order to regulate the future they need to represent stuff that isn’t there right – that will be there at some level of coarse graining but it’s currently not present so you need to have a system that is causally insulating part of your mechanical structure from the present…control systems that don’t just regulate the present but also regulate the future. But in order to regulate the future they need to represent stuff that isn’t there right that will be there at some level of coarse graining but it’s currently not present so you need to have a system that is causally insulating part of your mechanical structure from the present…”

I propose that groupings of moving objects don’t actually need to represent anything to appear to ‘control’ future states, and that no such need to represent could be fulfilled physically. All that would be needed are mechanical switches and timers that happened to have evolved to fit with environmental states that happen to repeat. If the brain needed to control the position of the legs in the future to walk successfully, it need only set aside some neurons for that purpose. They don’t need to represent anything or imagine the future, they just need to grow a miniature duplicate of the brain chemistry involved in walking but without being connected directly to efferent nerves to the legs. There doesn’t need to be a representational relationship hiding inside of chemistry, the chemistry just had to have accidentally evolved to accumulate a lot of repeating triggers of triggers.

In other words, there’s no reason to represent anything in the future when you can just use space instead of time. You don’t need to know that the wood you’re piling up is for burning in cold Winter if you have a statistical mechanism of mutation that happens to select for piling up wood and burn it if temperature conditions activate a thermal switch. Instead of executive consciousness, it would just happen that a brain that grows miniature low resolution copies of itself would end up pantomiming meta-cerebral functions. No feedback or representation at all, just parallel reproduction of self-similar neurochemical systems. No code or instructions are needed, just clockwork chain reactions.

I’m not suggesting that I think that’s what happened in reality. I think that the reality is that all phenomena are part of the way that conscious experiences are nested and relate to each other. If that were not the case, I doubt that biology as we know it would have evolved at all. I agree with Anastasia’s view that experience begins prior to the cell, and with Joscha’s view that there is nothing special about biology that would explain consciousness.

Where I do disagree with Joscha’s estimation of consciousness is in the attribution of ideas and motivations to robots:

3:28:55 AB: “it’s not obvious that the bacteria needs to be more conscious than a soccer playing robot which is not conscious. Right? Bacteria needs to be more conscious than a soccer playing robot which is not conscious right if you build a robot that plays soccer it’s the robot is fulfilling a bunch of function it’s going to model its environment it’s going to figure out where the ball is where the other robots are where the goal is how to get the ball between yourself and the goal how to push the ball into the goal and so on so in some Financial sense it’s going to have beliefs about the environment it’s going to have commitments about the course of actions it’s going to have full directive Behavior it’s going to have representations about the world with itself inside but I don’t think it experiences anything.“

I don’t see any reason to assume that a robot’s behavior requires the generation of any actual models, beliefs, or representations. The robot is just lots of switches switching switches that control the movements of the physically assembled parts that make it up. I like to use the example of a fishing net and how it is very effective at catching fish, but it doesn’t have to know anything about what it is doing. The size of the fish and the shape of the net are all that are needed. In the same way, the structure of the robot is all that is needed to explain why the robot parts move in the way that they must move – by physical law, not by models or beliefs.

In the video AB and MSD go on to talk about justifying the emergence of consciousness in bacteria but not in a robot because of either complexity or flexibility. Neither of these seem to me to warrant the creation of a new type of representational or qualitative metaphysics. Moving objects are just moving objects, no matter how many there are or how fancy their movements become.

3:34:18 AB: “…any exercise that attempts to explain consciousness without the physical substrate without recognizing that the physical substrate is mandatory for the effect that we’re seeing and is the iterative product of progressive complexity that has been evolving on Earth for the last four billion years will fail to produce Consciousness because it is inherent in the structural organization of these different modules that resonate with one another to create complexity

Here is a case where I agree with what Anastasia is saying in one sense but disagreeing completely in another. I agree that the human conscious experience probably has to result from billions of years of specific evolutionary history, however, I disagree that it is related to physical structures. I propose that the physical structures and mechanisms are effects, rather than causes, of how our conscious experience has developed. Because I think that the physical universe we see is an appearance in our evolved consciousness (see Donald Hoffman’s Interface theory), it is the trans-physical accumulation of conscious experiences themselves that the human qualities of our experience depend upon.

For this reason I do not think that human consciousness can be replicated or simulated mechanically. It’s not because biology alone is capable of providing complexity, flexibility, or harmonics, it’s because biology is the particular vocabulary that consciousness has developed for higher/richer forms of experience to use lower forms of conscious experience as a vehicle. I think that biology doesn’t generate consciousness, rather biology is a symptom of the interface between two different epochs and timescales of evolving conscious experience.

3:35:02 AB: “…the phenomenon of experience is all these different resonant modes you can think about what it feels like to listen to a sine wave versus what it feels like to listen to a symphony they’re the same thing except the sine wave has been modulated into something far more complex and that complex wave has something else in it.

I agree that a symphony is the same thing as complex modulations of sound, but again, a sine wave doesn’t sound like anything unless you can hear. The chain of physical causality ends in the silent brain. There is nothing about an auditory cortex that will be able to conjure sounds out of the oscillating changes in its chemistry. There is no evolutionary advantage to an organism that has to hear sounds rather than one that just transduces acoustic vibrations mechanically into oscillating electrochemical states. We know, for example, from Blindsight patients that the brain is perfectly capable of responding correctly to questions about optical conditions without any experience of visibility.

I agree with Joscha that there’s nothing special about biology as far as being an extra property above chemistry or physics. Again, it’s all just tangible objects moving each other around in public space.

3:38:37 – AB: “What the QRI work is interesting where it’s interesting because there appear to be different states inside the brain that correspond to emotional states and so if you are unhappy or you’re feeling depressed there’s a different brainwave state that is associated with that experience.

I think it’s important to understand that ‘correspond to’ can only happen in a conscious experience. Correspond isn’t a physical activity or structure. Physical states of a brain have no physical way to correspond to anything, so they are just what they appear to be – geometric changes in tangible shapes. Consciousness uses brains, but brains have no way to use consciousness. They have to use physical force – which also has no way to use consciousness. When we use a non-physical model of nature instead, there is no problem with some aspects of consciousness perceiving other aspects of itself as physics. We see it all the time in dreams.

3:40:33 JB: “What is actually sadness? Right? Sadness is an affect it is directed on some source of satisfying a need being permanently removed from your world can never get it back and it’s completely crucial to you. You identified the satisfying yourself through the source of satisfaction and it’s got it will never come back right this is sadness in some sense and a stronger form of sadness is grief it’s a paralyzing form of sadness and sadness leads to certain behaviors mostly a disengagement with the world because you’re helpless you cannot do anything about it. In supplicative behavior you are appealing to an environment to help you with the situation and to create a solution for a problem for which you’re incapable of finding one. And so sadness is some complex psychological phenomena that you can formally define and the question is how is it implemented in the brain?

And what’s also crucial about sadness is that you experience yourself changing as a result of sadness and without this experience you wouldn’t say that somebody is sad you would say somebody acts as if they are sad but there’s a difference between acting as if you are sad and actually being sad. Because that requires an experience of sadness. And so we are coming back to this original question how is it possible that the system that is mechanically implemented is actually feeling something and don’t say waves that are interacting with each other that sounds like magical thinking to me because it’s not adding anything beyond molecules bumping into each other and you’re saying more complexity it just means more molecules bumping more complexly into each other.“

I completely agree that any explanation of sadness based on waves doesn’t work, and that this is what the Hard Problem is all about. In Joscha’s discussion, he links sadness with semantic and behavioral correlates, but that too doesn’t explain emotion itself. Sadness is an affect but that doesn’t explain why or how affects could arise either from brain activity or events that happen to a biological organism.

Finishing up this segment, the discussion turns to conceptualization.

3:42:41 MSD – “…a concept is a relationship between two physical bodies so one is moving towards the other let’s say and then an abstract concept would be taking that motion and relating it to another concept and you can compound these into greater and greater degrees of abstraction…”

I disagree that concepts have anything to do with objects. Objects relate to each other in only one way as far as I can tell, and that is through the relation of the geometry of their shape, position, and motion. Nothing conceptual or abstract about that as far as I can tell, although since motion requires some sense of duration, we could distinguish objects from objects changing position/shape over time, with the latter being arguably less like a static object. Since stasis and velocity are both relative and dependent on perceptual framing (as is everything except perception itself), the idea of a static object is purely hypothetical. If we say that anything hypothetical is an abstraction, fair enough, but even so, it is an abstraction of geometric shapes and not a concept that departs from geoemtry.