Scientific Philosophy

October 30, 2012 5 comments

Scientific Philosophy.

An interview with Professor Massimo Pigliucci on the benefits of combining scientific fact gathering with philosophical introspection. He is the author of the book:

Answers for Aristotle: How Science and Philosophy Can Lead Us to A More Meaningful Life

I’m glad to see more consideration for philosophical thought in connection with the interpretation of science. He mentions Hume’s distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’, to point out how the existence of scientific fact does not, in and of itself, compel us toward any particular moral code.  No matter what science can tell us something ‘is’, the question  of what ought to be done about it still remains up for us to decide.

I am torn between wanting to applaud this effort at synthesizing empirical and rational epistemology, and I do, as far as it goes. Professor Pigliucci seems to express here a voice of well reasoned compatibilism, and to extend this reason to the subject matter itself. It is here where I am more critical of this approach, although in the contemporary context it is very much within the intellectual consensus.

While it is indeed a profound shift from pre-scientific moralism to expound a relativistic-existential world where we are each called upon to build our own meaning and morals, I find that this is not the whole picture. Rather than a neat, compartmentalized notion of reasoning which can be traced back to evolutionary biology and neuroscience in all cases, I see much more of a momentum of perception and participation, with universe as theater. This is not to suggest a naive idealism – indeed genetics and biochemistry are overwhelmingly powerful influences in staging our personal slice of the universal theater, but morality cannot be understood with toy models of social relation. The grip of morality on the individual, society, and species is far more visceral and irrational – made of shame and disgust, of soaring pride and worshipful appreciation of superlative qualities. To understand morality is to plumb the depths of myth – of monstrous crimes and the horrific images associated with them.

I think the distinction between the good, the bad, and the ugly is one which ultimately splits along the primary fault of consciousness, which I call sense and motive, or afferent vs efferent phenomenology. The afferent mode is our sensory input, our receptivity to beautiful and awful feelings, while the efferent mode is our motive output – our projection of selfish or enlightened actions in the world. This dyad-dialectic is primordial and intertwined so that our morality often uses one to justify the other. In movies, evil is typically represented by ugly characters in dark costumes. Throughout history people have been persecuted as witches or subhumans based on aesthetic prejudices.

It is interesting, in the wake of the horrors of the 20th century, despite being bombarded with evidence of the banality of evil, we are still surprised to find the most obscene crimes being committed by seemingly ordinary people, including priests, housewives, and police officers.  Despite the noticeable lack of organized violence by fringe groups professing interest in magick, loud anti-social music, and extreme body modification, such otherwise ordinary people are often treated with moral suspicion. This double standard, which I think arises from the unconscious equivalence between taboo perceptual themes and transgressive actions is beyond neurology and evolutionary biology and follows from experience itself.

Evolutionary biology can certainly help explain why the contents of taboo themes, which often deal with morbidity, mortality, and sexuality would tend to be associated with a repulsive affect by default, but it does not explain the specific content of that affect. It does not tell us about what fear is and what it tells us about ourselves. It is great to be able to quiet the mind’s questions with reassurances about neurotransmitter interactions and references to particular regions of the brain, but this approach can also cast us in the role of explaining away ourselves. By oversignifying the sub-personal and super-personal levels of our physical mechanism, the personal level of our native experience is depersonalized and robbed of its significance.

To talk about love and fear in terms of neuropeptide cocktails is all well and good for medical purposes, but the unfolding of a human identity in a human life is not so easily reduced into an exercise of forensic pathology. For anyone who has experienced powerfully significant moments in their life, it is not enough to hold up a molecule or a flowchart of hominid foraging, because the experience goes well beyond how one feels personally. Love and fear appear to operate transpersonally, to ‘warp the luck plane’ as it were, inviting unusual synchronicities and dramatic confrontations with would not occur otherwise. Our life, it would seem, can be known to us as a kind of organism made of events, of significance through time.

At this point, I think it might be career suicide for a scientist or philosopher to bring up these ideas (even though they have enjoyed popularity in the the 20th century), so I do not expect to see them in print. I hope that this will change soon, but in the mean time, I am glad that people are beginning to at least see a glimmer of a role again for the mind of the individual.

After Einstein’s Mollusk

October 16, 2012 3 comments

I’m beginning to realize that Multisense Realism is an extension to the absolute of the approach that Einstein took in developing General Relativity. In doubting the existence of gravity as a product in space, he opened the door to a simpler universe where physical things relate to each other in an ordered way, not because some particular propulsion system is in place, but because the frame of reference of physical order itself is not rigid as we assume. He actually calls this new, flexible relativism of space co-ordinates ‘mollusks’:

“This non-rigid reference-body, which might appropriately be termed a “reference-mollusk,” is in the main equivalent to a Gaussian four-dimensional co-ordinate system chosen arbitrarily. That which gives the “mollusk” a certain comprehensibleness as compared with the Gauss co-ordinate system is the (really unqualified) formal retention of the separate existence of the space co-ordinate. Every point on the mollusk is treated as a space-point, and every material point which is at rest relatively to it as at rest, so long as the mollusk is considered as reference-body. The general principle of relativity requires that all these mollusks can be used as reference-bodies with equal right and equal success in the formulation of the general laws of nature; the laws themselves must be quite independent of the choice of mollusk.”

– Albert Einstein, Relativity: The Special and General Theory.  1920.
XXVIII.  Exact Formulation of the General Principle of Relativity

Einstein’s transcendence of ‘rigid reference bodies’ with flexible and independent inertial frames captures the essence of relativity but only scratches the surface in exposing the rigidity of physics, which, even in the post-Einsteinian era reduces the participant to a zero dimensional vector generic ‘observer’. While this adherence to rigid simplicity is critical for ‘freezing the universe’ into a static frame for computation purposes, it introduces an under-signifying bias to all matters pertaining to subjectivity – particularly emotion, identity, and meaning. In its drive for simplicity and universality, physics inadvertently becomes an agenda for the annihilation of the self and psyche.

Part of the genius of Einstein was to glimpse the tip of the iceberg of this confirmation bias and challenge it successfully through his mastery of field equations. In my view, Einstein’s vision was only partially understood, just long enough to develop a kind of Empire Strikes Back counter-revolution. After the initial flush of Bohr and Heisenberg’s relativistic-probabilistic interpretations of Quantum Mechanics in the 1920’s (The Spirit of Copenhagen), physics seems to have sought out a new level of reductionism. Information science has dissected Einsteins Mollusk into bits and strings, and re-imagining flexibility and independence as phantoms of a Multi-World Matrix. Einstein’s cosmological animism has been transformed into a cosmological animation – a simulation of matter-like information (that doesn’t matter) in a vacuum virtual sea of Dark Energy.

Rather than seeing this as a sign that we have come to a bold new understanding of cosmic existentialism, I see this as a black octagon sign of having mistaken the cul-de-sac for a highway. We have failed to understand ourselves and our universe and need to turn the whole thing completely around. The way to do this, I propose, is to go back to Einstein’s mollusk and pick up where he left off, questioning the rigidity of physical reference bodies.

In a way, I am suggesting that we relativize relativity itself. Not in the pop culture appropriation of relativism as merely the principle that ‘everything is relative’, but to understand how relation itself is the principle through which ‘everything’ is realized, and that that principle is identical with ‘sense’, i.e. subjective participation and perception of self and other.

While physical science is perfectly content to predict and control matter, I have no doubt that pursuing this goal exclusively should carry the kind of warning which science fiction has been giving us from the start: We should be careful of developing technology that we can’t handle and the way to handle technology is to evolve our own humanity.

It is for this very reason, that purely mathematical approaches to understanding the universe as a whole and consciousness are ultimately doomed. Their rigidity arises from a reference frame which is intrinsically incompatible with the floridly eidetic and creative frame of human privacy. Where General Relativity envisioned a flexible reference body of spacetime coordinates which contrasted with Galilean-Cartesian uniformity, this new reference frame that should be explored contrasts against both the Classical, Einsteinian, and Quantum frameworks. Multisense realism provides a Meta-Relativistic framework which honors the canonical conjugates of general relativity in proprietary privacy of subjectivity. The universe within, like Bohm’s implicate order, is as alien to spacetime relativism as Einstein’s mollusk was to Newton. The new mollusk is not one of space and time united, but of time and ‘time again’, of literal and figurative significance, symmetry and meta-juxtaposition. The new framework begins with no beginning, but rather an infinite centripetal involution which is accessed directly through intra-corporeal participation and inter-corporeal perception.

October 13, 2012 Leave a comment

October 5, 2012 Leave a comment

The Candle: Looking at Light in a New Way

Conventional assumptions about light infer a particle-wave-beam of ‘energy’ traveling literally through space independently.

The multisense conjecture suggests participatory events which occur at each local material site. Each local perception embodies the local condition and perspective as a gestalt capitulation which includes traces of its relation with the other events.

This gestalt capitulation (and I know this sounds like gobbledygook to most everyone but me) can be understood as an apocatastatic algebra (reconstitution, restitution,or restoration to the original or primordial condition) of elliptical simultaneity (elliptical in this sense meaning intuitive gesture which is unspecified yet adequately informative to the receiver; ellipsis ‘…’, ‘see what I mean?’)  rather than linear process. It’s the opposite of a linear process – perception is the end point of all process the beginning point of all participation.

Think of this more like feeling your fingers by touching them together. They are all part of your hand in one sense, on one level, but separate on another. Multisense realism proposes that the entire cosmos is like the hand, with each event growing like fingers, each of which are growing fingers, etc. What we experience as matter and bodies is where the fingers touch each other and feel that they are not identical.

Sense, then, or in this case light* is an event communicating essential connection and essential disconnection. Light is like the fingers feeling that they are part of the same hand, making sense of each other in a way which reveals both the conditional truth of their separation (transparency and illumination passing through dense material realism), the unconditional truth of their unity (in rich experiential qualia aka personal significance, poetic ‘light’,’warmth’, ‘divinity’), and the spatio-temporal modulation between the two (precise topological-algebraic formalism)

*heat, motion, sound, force, change, etc are all different qualities of the same thing

A discussion about the structure of visual space

October 5, 2012 Leave a comment

Light Has No Speed

October 5, 2012 19 comments
Part of multisense realism is a new interpretation of light – what it actually is. As I am not a physicist, there is no way to introduce this idea without sounding like a crackpot, but nevertheless I have not found any reason to suspect that this view is wrong. To the contrary, the more time that goes by and the more experts who I talk to about it with, the more I am confident that this understanding is closer to the truth than any other that I have come across. To begin with, it is necessary to come to grips with the worldview which is implied by Einstein’s Special Relativity. In doing so, I think that it can be said that actually, There Is No ‘Speed of Light’.

At least not in the way that most people would think of it, if they did ever think of it. There is a speed at which a state of illumination radiates from molecule to molecule or body to body which depends on physical qualities of the bodies in question, but I think that it is correct to say that light does not travel ‘through’ a vacuum at all, but figuratively jumps from within bodies sympathetically through perception and imitative participation.  It is the behavior of matter which waves and scatters, not independent projectiles or structures of any kind. Light, warmth, color, motion, are experiences, not objects.

Albert Einstein postulated that the speed of light with respect to any inertial frame is independent of the motion of the light source, and explored the consequences of that postulate by deriving the special theory of relativity and showing that the parameter c had relevance outside of the context of light and electromagnetism. After centuries of increasingly precise measurements, in 1975 the speed of light was known to be 299,792,458 m/s with a measurement uncertainty of 4 parts per billion. In 1983, the metre was redefined in the International System of Units (SI) as the distance travelled by light in vacuum in 1 ⁄ 299,792,458 of a second. As a result, the numerical value of c in metres per second is now fixed exactly by the definition of the metre.

I’m not an expert by any means, but the thing that makes light interesting is in the first sentence above: “the speed of light with respect to any inertial frame is independent of the motion of the light source”. This is that business of how velocities are added among moving objects, but not with light. Light is always faster than any object, no matter how fast the object is moving. Light is not just the fastest thing, it is the thing that defines faster-than-anything-elseness.

What I think special relativity tells us is that contrary to this conception of light, what is actually going on looks like this:

image

This is the tricky part because although my rendition of the entire beam appearing instantaneously is, I think, correct within this hypothetical setup of a human scale train, if this train were millions of times larger, then it could be argued that the beam would actually grow non-instantaneously compared to a human sized observer (i.e. miniscule). Rather than thinking of being able to see light moving, I think we have to anchor ourselves in the fixed Einsteinian constant of c, and understand that the latency which we observe (in a radio transmission between a distant spacecraft and the control center on Earth, for example), is not the result of waves of ‘energy’ traveling through space from antenna to antenna, but rather a reflection of the relative scales of the events involved. When we talk to the spacecraft we have to use a much larger ‘here-and-now’ compared to our own native human scaled time, so that the nesting of smaller and larger nows is reflected as scaled experiences of delay. This is just how matter makes sense of itself on different scales. It is not the speed of light, it is the speed of speed or the speed of sense, matter, or time.

The picture that I propose would be more accurate is this:

image

As our naive perception suggests, there is no concretely real ‘beam’ of light, rather there is a spot of light present at the target, as well as an illumination at the flashlight source, and in our eyes, and (not pictured) in our upscaled human mind.

In other words, when we think of light as having a speed, we are not really understanding the full ramifications of special relativity and are merely projecting our Newtonian-Cartesian prejudices onto something which is not classical. The reason that it is not classical, however, I propose, is because visible light is not a projectile at all, but rather access to visual sensitivity, i.e. an extension of self-experience to incorporate the appearance of non-self in the visual range of percpeption (as opposed to tactile, aural, olfactory, emotional, or intellectual).

*gifs cannibalized from here.

I recently discovered this video, apparently of a Feynman lecture, that supports the MSR view:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=12Kr–F7hm0

Being Human: Mental + Representations & Decision-Making

September 21, 2012 Leave a comment

Being Human: Mental + Representations & Decision-Making

01:20 to 20:36 Laurie Santos, Comparative Psychologist, Yale
Decision making bias in gain vs. loss.

A nice example that challenges assumptions of human exceptionalism and gives insights into the relativity of perceived risk.

20:37 – 39:39 Thomas Metzinger, Philosopher, Gutenberg University
The Self Model – Internal representation of the self as a whole (ownership).

I would argue against ‘representation’. It is a presentation, which, although it can be fooled, is not necessarily a figment of computation. Instead, it’s about resolving conflicts between levels. We rely on vision to inform our experience more than any other channel of sense, so that more subtle awareness can be subsumed. If you close your eyes, you won’t be fooled. If you try to move your hand your intention to move it won’t get lost. It is then premature to assume a literal self model as mathematical entity.

Body image displacement/dissociation. Rubber hand, video displacement, remote prosthetic robotics.

Assumes an invisible interface which hides neurocomputation, rather than neurocomputation being a visible interface which hides awareness. I disagree that there is a medium. Naive realism is actually limited realism of genuine experience, not an abstract model or program.

39:40 01:01 – David Eagleman, Neuroscientist, Baylor University
Expressing the assumptions of neuroscience – of immense sub-personal complexity underlying personal hallucination, i.e. complex = “real”, condensed = “illusory”. I think this is an important phase to pass through in understanding but ultimately needs to be overcome. When the personal layer examines the sub-personal (‘in-cognito) layers through impersonal instruments, the result is a ‘gap’ between unconscious operations and (unexplained) representation. I maintain that this view is almost correct, but from a more objective perspective is perfectly inverted.

Good stuff about how brain damage can change identity, even if part of you is unchanged. This speaks to the power of sub-personal and neurological conditions, but I think that it is a mistake to presume that consciousness in general supervenes on neurology in general. By changing what we think about and what we do with our bodies, our neurology follows that intention rather than leads it. We can also look to this assumption and follow it down the microcosm, from neurons to molecules, to atoms, to quantum, and wind up lacking a meaningful substrate that has any more explanatory power than the top level phenomenological experience. If anything, the subjective experience of perception and participation is far more insightful as to why the body is doing what it does than the probabilistic irrationality of the ultra-microcosm.

There is a disconnect also – where the neuroscientific perspective completely embraces a bio-deterministic picture of consciousness in every individuals, but a blind faith in a rationalist intervention free-will picture of social policy. Somehow we are slaves to our neurology in all matters except when it comes to redesigning our legal system. In these matters, society is suddenly not modeled as inevitable computations of interacting brain-vehicles, but as an open marketplace of disembodied ideas which can be assessed without bias and evaluated independently of neurophysiology.

There is no explanation offered to bridge this gap. How can we be bound and blinded by naive realism, yet able to understand this blindness with crystal clarity? How can we believe that we have no real free will yet casually suggest that we should choose to use our free will to intentionally contribute to social progress?

I do agree that retribution is “a Stone Age concept”, but at the same time, why should we expect that society as a whole should be able to transcend the pre-Stone Age concepts of the individuals that make it up? We can only do that if we admit that under typical conditions, we do have some genuine participation in our own thoughts and actions. We can’t take all the credit or blame, but neither can we escape it completely either.

The neurofeedback treatment for addiction that David Eagleman describes around 01:15 sounds great. My sense is that it hasn’t worked as well as it seems like it should in theory. I’m not knocking the approach, I think it’s a good start, but still rooted in mechanism, behaviorism, and ultimately the neo-phrenological assumptions of contemporary neuroscience. I don’t want to minimize the importance of this kind of research, but I think that we are missing the big picture by insisting on the software model of consciousness.

In the last ten minutes: Good stuff on pre-linguistic concepts of justice and fairness. Three month old infants choose good puppets over bad innately.

I agree that first person accounts do not describe what is going on within the brain, but neither do analyses of what is going on within the brain anticipate anything at all about consciousness, including consciousness itself. We have to take our own word for our existence to begin with, then we can figure out how it is that our experience doesn’t show up in the structures of the brain.

Approaching it that way, I find the solution is that it is actually matter in space which is the reduction and re-presentation of experience and not the other way around. Matter extends in a different way than direct subjective experience, the opposite way, so that when we look at matter we are seeing a representation of many, many experiences on many different scales and frequencies – some seem frozen in time to us, others seem to be changing so fast that they are in superposition.

Zoe Drayson: The autonomy of the mental and the personal/subpersonal distinction

September 7, 2012 105 comments

“I listen to lots of audio and try to package some of it for mass consumption on tumblr.  I heard something I thought was really interesting today, but that I thought would NOT have mass appeal (the speaker was also… er… well, she was a good academic!).  But I thought you would find it interesting.

It was about several different ways to consider “levels” (what I’ve often called “levels of complexity”).  The context: a talk from a conference on the Personal vs Subpersonal distinction made by Dennett.

Here are some types of levels as I remember them:

  1. Whole and Parts… somewhat self-explanatory
  2. Functional Definition and Realization.  So a mind might be functionally defined by what it does.  And the “lower level” brain state is a Realization of that Mind.
  3. Simplification… a SubPerson (at a lower level) is similar to a Person (higher level), only with some simplification to avoid infinite regress (eventually arriving at purely mechanistic processes).
  4. Access.  The Person (higher level) only has access to a subset of what the SubPerson has access to (Thus one of my subpersons might be aware of how my visual attention is focussed, while “I” am not, etc).

That’s from memory, so I hope I did the speaker justice (her name was Zoey Dreyson I think).

None of these quite matches what I think of as levels of complexity.  I’d say my criteria for “qualifying as a new level” are higher than these.  She almost hit it at one point when she suggested Water can be liquid, while H20 cannot… this might be an archetypal level switch for me.

In case you’re interested, here’s the website and the audio.  Love to hear what you think, no rush of course.

Chris aka memeengine”

Hi Chris,

Thanks, yes interesting lecture. Here’s some notes and then I’ll throw in my comments:

  • personal: mental states as functional roles (“Roles”)
  • subpersonal: brain states that realize these roles in humans (“Realizers”)

‘autonomy of the mental’ in this philosophical context = ontological autonomy

nonreductive physicalism

cognitive science methodology: explain capacities of cog systems in terms of interacting cog subsystems (like car = sum of interacting car parts). Homuncular analysis-decomposition. Modularized cognition to sub, and sub-sub levels without regress.

in cog sci, whole person = person qua cognitive system

under the cog sci view, sub-personal levels or parts are vehicles for cognitive content, i.e. functionally individuated physical states bearing content. Therefore cognitive subsystems = sub-persons

1978 Steve Stitch labeled these instead of personal and sub-personal as

  • doxastic states
  • sub-doxastic states

[doxastic logic, like Bp & p to me seems to me an extremely narrow approach to a particular aspect of cognitive consciousness. I think that taking these kinds of programmatic structural views of belief and truth really turn the picture of consciousness upside down and assume binary systems as fundamental when there is no hint that such systems generate fluid wholes without an interpreter]

normative vs non-normative
cognitive whole vs cog parts

sub person level is further divided as being

  • accessible to persons
  • accessible to sub-persons

in role/realizer relation, higher & lower level properties related by realization relation – instantiated in same individual, share causal power

in the whole/parts relation, higher & lower level properties have different causal powers, instantiated in different individuals. Mereological. Composition. Water has liquidity and wetness that hydrogen and oxygen molecules don’t have.

  • Functionalist school in phil of mind – personal level states defined by their functional role.
  • cognitive science methodology – personal level capacities are explained by functional analysis.

functionalist metaphysics vs computationalist psychology

Lycan: homuncular functionalism – metaphysics inspired by cog sci methodology

role-realizer/part-whole conflation: who says what realization is? science or metaphysics?

some views claim realization implicit in decomposition [I would call this emergentism]

flat vs dimensioned realization. Science says realizers highly compex property. hardness of a diamond [emergent property]

levels: mereological and realization, supervenience, gnomic? ‘bridge laws’? structures all comport? not necessarily

Conclusion: What is important is to define the nature of realization relation. Who gets to do that? Seems to come down to metaphysical preferences.

Listening to this lecture really underscores for me how different the approach of multisense realism is to anything that is being discussed academically. To my mind, the role/realizer and part/whole relations are analogous to the character in a story – say Alice is trying to describe herself in terms of being composed of either the grammatical structure in the sentences of the story from which she emerges, or whether she is composed of the bleached and pressed wood pulp and ink that are considered page parts of the whole book.

Both approaches are wrong in exactly the opposite way. It is the same with idealism and materialism in general. Nothing means anything without perception and participation to begin with. There is, to my way of thinking, zero possibility of perception or participation experiences emerging from either

  • Inked pages in a book (physical parts in a mereological relation realizing the emergent property of the whole)
  • Words from the English language in a specific sequence (roles functioning at the personal level being realized by optical character forms configured at the sub-personal level)

The approach that is not even considered is that both the physically privileged page-book mereology and the logically privileged typesetting-linguistic mereology are related to each other only through an agent of perception-participation. This is the multisense realism view. Neither the philosophical functionalist nor the cognitive science computationalist sense of the personal and sub-personal relation can justify the existence of the relation itself. That’s because they leave out perception and participation entirely. It objectifies personal subjects and then pseudo-subjectifies objects as sub-persons without ever anchoring any of it in any kind of experiential realism. The thing that we care about is ignored completely. The hard problem is painted over with a choice of two flavors of the easy problem.

The only way around this, I’m afraid, is through it. Begin with the reality of Alice as the given. We don’t have to believe that she is anything more than a character or that her life is anything other than a story, but if the character and story were really the ground of being for Alice, then the book of pages (brain hardware) and the language typed through those pages (cognitive software) both make sense as ways of stabilizing, controlling, and reproducing aspects of the story. The book is what makes Alice in Wonderland a publicly accessible artifact and the words are what mediate from the public spatial sense to the private temporal sense. The private motive, in turn, to open the book, read the words, and imagine the characters and scenes in the story are what bind the symbols to the private sense experience. Body needs the book, mind needs the words, but story needs the willing self.

What this means is that all of the levels discussed in the lecture are not personal or sub-personal at all, but rather impersonal (surface-topological) and impersonal (syntactic-depth). I propose a whole other half of this picture of consciousness of which, to paraphrase Wittgenstein, we cannot speak, thereof we must remain silent. We can however, listen.

We cannot speak about the personal, but we can know what it is to be a person. We can realize ourselves directly, as an autonomous presence without converting ourselves into an external appearance or function. We can let human experience be human experience, and nothing less. The psyche, to continue with the Alice in Wonderland metaphor, has a protagonist – an Alice. It has other characters too, and themes, and a plot, etc…or does it? Does it literally ‘have a plot’, or are stories more of an experience with multiple frequency layers of events, memories, and expectations?

The story is nothing like either the words that relate them or the book that is the vehicle for the words. I can say ‘do you know Alice in Wonderland?’ and you can say yes, and describe some of the memorable scenes or quote lines or whatever – maybe you haven’t even read the book. The many forms that the story has been enacted, plays, cartoons, satire, songs, etc are all neither a part of the story or not a part of the story. The experience, the consciousness is orthogonal to both the physical formations and logical information associated with them. Of course, I am being absolutely literal here. Multisense realism is the idea that realism arises entirely from the orthogonality or perpendicular juxtaposition of private facing perception and public facing participation.

Once we can fully appreciate the magnitude of the shift that this model presents, going all the way up and down the microcosm-macrocosm, physics and phenomenology, we can perhaps expect to apply the orthogonality completely with confidence. Every atom is a page. Every molecule is a book. Every molecule and atom are publications of quantum-electromagnetic literature. Not only is there also a story which is told through that literature filled book, but there is also an omnipotent protagonist-author trying to awaken.This is an entirely different kind of sub-personal level. In the case of human consciousness, these micro-monads are sub-selves. Not things or ideas but influences, feelings, drives and complex dialectical drive-negation-drives, meta-feelings, histories of thought, interminable arguments…psychology, sociology.

This is what can’t be located by a functionalist or computationalist approach because they try to build a self from a bottom-up nothingness rather than a top-down everythingness. It’s not a new idea, but the application of the Absolute (Totality, Singularity, Supreme Monad, Ein Sof, Tao, Om, etc..) to physics in a literal way I think is actually necessary and feasible. From information science we can approach it as the essence of non-repeatability, or what I call solitropy. Start from there. From physics we can approach the cosmology as a Big Diffraction rather than a Big Bang. Recognize that spacetime makes more sense as a virtual incursion into a singularity of mass-energy than an as an explosion of mass-energy into a spacetime plenum which doesn’t exist yet.

Deleuze’s The Logic of Sense, Part I

August 27, 2012 3 comments

Deleuze, The Logic of Sense

Some quotes from the book and comments.

“It is only by breaking open the circle, as in the case of the Möbius strip, by unfolding and untwisting it, that the dimension of sense appears for itself, in its irreducibility, and also in its genetic power as it animates an a priori internal model of the proposition.”

Some important themes here: The irreducibility of sense, the connection with closure and involution, topology and animation. There is a sense of the meta-juxtaposition of self-similarity that is at the heart of the universality and specificity of sense.

“It is surprising to find that Carroll’s entire logical work* is directly about signification, implications, and conclusions, and only indirectly about sense – precisely, through the paradoxes which signification does not resolve, or indeed which it creates. On the contrary, the fantastic work is immediately concerned with sense and attaches the power of the paradox to it. This corresponds to the two states of sense, de facto and de jure, a posteriori and a priori, one by which the circle of the proposition is indirectly inferred, the other by which it is made to appear for itself, by unfolding the circle along the length of the border between propositions and things.”

*Lewis Carroll was the pseudonym of Charles Dodgson, who also published mathematical literature under that name.

The multisense model has been to try to simplify this cleaving and reconciling. By identifying private time as the direct form of sensemaking and public space as the indirect form, the orthogonality between the two is also their union. I appreciate his pointing out of the two sides of Lewis Carroll, and how they speak to direct and indirect sense.

Quoting from Carroll:

He thought he saw an Elephant
That practiced on a fife:
He looked again, and found it was
A letter from his wife.
“At length I realize,” he said,
“The bitterness of Life!”

He thought he saw a Buffalo
Upon the chimney-piece:
He looked again, and found it was
His Sister’s Husband’s Niece.
“Unless you leave this house,” he said,
“I’ll send for the Police!”

He thought he saw a Kangaroo
That worked a coffee-mill:
He looked again, and found it was
A Vegetable-Pill.
“Were I to swallow this,” he said,
“I should be very ill!”

He thought he saw a Coach-and-Four
That stood beside his bed:
He looked again, and found it was
A Bear without a Head.
“Poor thing,” he said, “poor silly thing!
It’s waiting to be fed!”

He thought he saw a Garden-Door
That opened with a key:
He looked again, and found it was
A Double Rule of Three:
“And all its mystery,” he said,
“Is clear as day to me!”

He thought he saw an Argument
That proved he was the Pope:
He looked again, and found it was
A Bar of Mottled Soap.
“A fact so dread,” he faintly said,
“Extinguishes all hope!”

– Lewis Carroll, The Mad Gardener’s Song

The poem is discussed early on, with its rhythmic juxtaposition of buoyant fantasy and grim realism, or perhaps mania and depression.  The analysis offered brings out deeper duality between concrete entities in the world and spoken words…how the abstraction of words contains and deflates the broad absurdity of imagination. Words silence the child’s inner world with the adulteration of logic. Direct sense is overpowered by circumspection of logical, indirect sense through time and experience.

“The duality in the proposition is not between two sorts of names, names of stasis and names of becoming, names of substances or qualities and names of events; rather, it is between two dimensions of the proposition, that is, between denotation and expression, or between the denotation of things and the expression of sense. It is like the two sides of a mirror, only what is on one side has no resemblance to what is on the other.”

That last line is perhaps the most critical point of the multisense realism approach. I have referred to it as anomalous symmetry. A dual aspect monism where the sense of public space is a reflection of the sense of private time, but in a completely different – really orthogonal way.

“The philosopher Avicenna distinguished three states of essence: universal in relation to the intellect which thinks it in general; and singular in relation to the particular things in which it is embodied. But neither of these two states is essence itself. An animal is nothing other than an animal (“animal non est nisi animal tantum”) being indifferent to the universal and to the singular, to the particular and to the general. The first state of essence is essence signified by the proposition, in the order of the concept and of conceptual implications. The second state of essence is essence as designated by the proposition in the particular things in which it is involved. But the third state of essence is essence as sense, essence as expressed – always in this dryness (animal tantum) and this splendid neutrality. It is indifferent to the universal and to the singular, to the general and to the particular, to the personal and the collective; it is also indifferent to affirmation and negation, etc. In short, it is indifferent to all opposites. This is so because all of these opposites are but modes of the proposition considered in its relations of denotation and signification, and not the traits of the sense which it expresses. Is it, then, the status of the pure event, or of the fatum which accompanies it, to surmount all the oppositions in this way? Neither private nor public, neither collective nor individual…, it is more terrible and powerful in this neutrality, to the extent that is all of these things at once.”

Many of the diagrams employed here (supreme ultimate diagrams) feature sense ‘surmounting’ essence and existence. This echoes Deleuze noting here the supremacy of sense in its detachment from the oppositions which are generated within it.

p. 35  “…he writes about the addition of impossible propositions to the possible (signification) and the real (denotation). I conceive of absurdity and the far East end of a continuum of sense rather than a category. An absurd proposition makes sense on some levels or parts but presents an abstract disjunction or mutually exclusive juxtaposition. It is a type of nonsense that refers to itself, and therefore makes a kind of negative sense, as opposed to nonsense as noise lacking signal.”

In my view, propositions can be more or less absurd, more plausible, and even more or less concretely real. The so called primary and secondary attributes of Locke suggest a hierarchy of realism which is intuitive. Qualities that can be measured reliably using inanimate objects as instruments are seen to be primary aspects of realism. Secondary are colors, flavors, etc which vary from person to person and culture to culture. They are subjective but still object-facing. It is interesting that he too refers to sense as a continuum with an Eastern end.

p. 53 The distinction is not between two sorts of events, it is between the event, which is ideal by nature, and its spatio-temporal realization in a state of affairs. The distinction is between event and accident. Events are ideational singularities which communicate in one and the same Event. They have therefore an eternal truth, and their time is never the present which realizes them and makes them exist. Rather it is the unlimited Aion, the Infinitive in which they subsist and insist. Events are the only idealities. To reverse Platonism is first and foremost to remove essences and to substitute events in their place, as jets of singularities.

p.60 For only thought finds it possible to affirm all chance and to make chance into an object of affirmation.

Interesting commentary which can be seen to relate directly to the multisense diagram depicting Sense on the top edge opposing chance or “?” on the bottom. In a way, it is the role of thought to assign the degree of chance affirmation – it is the eye of mandatory intentionality in the hurricane of semi-intentional potentiality. Thought is the capacity to interpret chance, ie to consciously foreground pattern as significant.

p.61 …what is this time which need not be infinite but only “infinitely subdivisible”? We have seen that past, present, and future were not at all three parts of a single temporality, but that they rather formed two readings of time, each one of which is complete and excludes the other: on one hand, the always limited present, which measures the action of bodies as causes and the state of their mixtures in depth (Chronos); on the other, the essentially unlimited past and future, which gather incorporeal events, at the surface, as effects (Aion).

Great stuff. If I understand the terminology correctly, Chronos can be identified with spacetime and Aion as timespace or dreamtime. Aion is the native, direct modality of experience which is interior and metaphorical. Chronos is the involution of Aion, the orthogonal cross-section of the totality as public literal exterior. Chronos is the perpetually fleeting snapshot that cuts through the mechanical interactions of bodies within bodies (inertial frames within frames) as a generic ‘now’. By contrast, the Aion is the uncut flow of multiplexed influences seeking manifestation. The two interact as coherence-decoherence in Chronos spacetime and decoherence-recoherence through Aion dreamtime.

P. 64. Carroll would say that they are the multiplication table and the dinner table. The Aion is precisely the border of the two, the straight line which separates them; but it is also the plain surface which connects them, an impenetrable window or glass.

This gets very esoteric, but my model differs here from Deleuze in that I see two opposite kinds of borders on opposite ends of Aion – one, is the pedestrian fold between, as he says, the multiplication table and the dinner table (figurative vs literal sense of table) and the other I call the profound edge, where the twist between literal and figurative vanishes ‘behind our backs’ as unconscious or trance-like numinous states of unity. This is the eidetic transformation, where hypnotic re-orientation can take place. Here we find the simulacra nature of consciousness, the unrealism of reality is exposed nakedly while we are otherwise occupied. Aion and Chronos are the profound edge and the pedestrian fold, the back door and front door to narrative (temporal) realism.

In Chronos, ambiguity is shunted off into errors of perception and measurement, so that infinite regress is drowned in decoherence. In Aion, paradox is reconciled through unconsciousness – the level upon which paradox is encountered is ultimately evanescent into greater and lesser levels. The dreamer falls asleep or wakes up, ending the dream. The scientist or philosopher cannot end the dream, and must distract the inquiry with argumentation and formalism.

p. 72  It is thus pleasing that there resounds today that sense is never a principle or an origin, but that it is produced. It is not something to discover, to restore, and to re-employ; it is something to produce by a new machinery. It belongs to no height or depth, but rather to a surface effect, being inseparable from the surface which is its proper dimension. It is not that sense lacks depth or height, but rather that height and depths lack surface, that they lack sense, or have it only by virtue of an “effect” which presupposes sense.

Here I disagree. I think that sense here is considered in too narrow of a ‘sense’ in this passage, limited as sensation or cognition at the point of contact. While sensation does indeed transpire at the surface, it is the translucence of sense which lends the significance of the depths beneath it. I can agree that sense is something to produce by a new machinery, but that every part of the machinery is also a sense experience on another layer/scope/frame. It is not the machinery level which produces sense, it is the level from which the machine’s use is initiated which which recovers new sense for itself, not only as a product but as an extension or revelation of the self through the objects of the machinery. New experience opens a window into new worlds of potential experience, and new doors of actual experience by the self. Surface and depth define each other. It is the sense of their contrast which acts as an originating principle. How could it be otherwise? What is sense other than the capacity to appreciate the contrast fully?

What Deleuze may have overlooked is that depth is nothing but an accumulation of surface effects. Indeed, there is nothing else besides sense that could be said to be responsible for the manifestation of the unsensed. The connection that he has not yet made is that what is surface to us is depth to another frame of reference, and vice versa. Marine organisms make sense in liquid, but it is the lighter fluid of air which poses a boundary for their world. Cells within bodies presumably exist in a universe of haptic (tactile perception of shapes) phenomenology. Surface, under multisense realism, is in the eye of the beholder, a naive realism apportioned out by scale ratios and perceptual entropy summation. Sense does not occur at the surface, sense juxtaposes itself as a surface/depth, as space manifold/unfolding time.

p. 81 Sense is always an effect produced in the series by the instance which traverses them. This is why sense, such as it is gathered over the line of the Aion, has two sides which correspond to the dissymmetrical sides of the paradoxical element: one tending toward the series determined as signifying, the other tending toward the series determined as signified.

Nice assimilation between sensation and semiosis. The idea of sense being activated or defining itself through the consequence of a breaching event. Negative mechanism. Dark current. The implicate order becomes explicit under conditions of interruption. The category does not exist until something insists upon defining itself against the schema. Sense as immunomorphic system.

P.87 Body-sieve, fragmented body, and dissociated body – these are the three primary dimensions of the schizophrenic body…In this collapse of the surface, the entire world loses its meaning.

I don’t entirely agree. While in a sense the surface of realism fails, I would not say that the world loses its meaning. Rather the world is transparent to any and every possible meaning. I suspect that here Deleuze is taking the often noted word-salad quality of schizophrenic communication too literally. In my opinion, such expression is as much a compulsive syntactic self-stimulation – in rhyme and repetition, as it is revealing of genuine attempts to make coherent sense. It is the depth which collapses into the surface, nakedly exposed without regard to the competing depths represented by social convention.

This commentary on schizophrenic sense strikes me also as stereotyped and idealized. I would imagine that actual diagnosed cases of schizophrenia vary in their linguistic manifestations to some degree. This chapter seems to isolate schizophrenia itself as a single author whose work stands in a particular contradistinction to common sense uses of language.

There may be something that Deleuze is pointing out by idealizing schizophrenic sense which is important. The dichotomy between Carroll’s use of satire to play with sense and the schizophrenic transgressions against sense. He frequently notes the malicious, even violent themes in schizophrenic expression in contrast to the carefully crafted ‘nonsense’ of the Alice stories.

The entire section “Fourteenth Series of Double Causality” seems especially opaque to me. He seems to be voicing vague dissatisfaction with Husserl and Kant but not really offering much in the way of a coherent view of causality. He seems to be struggling with a desire to appease physics while retaining an ambivalent substance dualism “The events of a liquid surface refer to the inter-molecular modifications as their real cause, but also to the variations of a surface tension on which they depend as their (ideational or “fictive” quasi-cause”. He talks about a “double causality, referring on one hand to mixtures of bodies which are its cause and, on the other, to other events which are its quasi-cause”, while maintaining that the corporeal cause is linked through surface dynamics to the incorporeal quasi-cause.

My impression is that Deleuze has a shortsighted view of sense here, eloquently (if obliquely) tuned into many nuances of sense, but still viewing human sense essentially as a monolith. In light of so much recent evidence of sensemaking in other species and in microorganisms, it would seem that there is no reason to presume that what seems like quasi-cause on one level would not be experienced as corporeal cause on another. Not double causality, but multiple intercausality.

Once the incorporeal/ideational is freed from the expectation of pseudosubstantiation, it can be understood as the temporal-private basis from which spatial-public extension is propagated (through sense). The ideational is not incorporeal, rather the corporeal is the orthogonal condensation of subjectivity. Both are physically and concretely real, each being the anomalous reflection of the other. The idea of in incorporeality arises from the reliance of objectification as the primary basis for modeling mistakenly turned on the act of modeling itself, failing to meet its own contrived expectations and subordinating its own efficacy as ‘quasi’ or fictive. When we have the idea to stomp on an anthill, the consequences for thousands of ants are not ‘quasi’ or fictive.

In his Fifteenth Series of Singularities, Deleuze makes a case for phenomenology as a function of surfaces. “the surface is the locus of sense“. He quotes Gilbert Simondon, “To belong to interiority does not mean only to ‘be inside,’ but to be on the ‘in-side’ of the limit…”

I agree that the surface defines the active region of sense, as the functional sense of sense can be described as input/output, the point of contact between sensory singularities (monads/selves/nuclei/bodies) would necessarily be on the periphery or skin. From a more objective point of view, we might say that it is not sense that happens on the surface, but rather surfaceness though which sense presents its most self-reflective presentations.

There is no reason to imagine that the depths of bodies are any less sensitive on their own inertial frame, and it is perfectly reasonable to expect that our aggregate sense of ourselves as human beings would include mainly a skin-deep precipitate of the totality of the experience of our sub-selves. Without any eruptive emergencies from within, the backgrounding of bodily depths in our waking consciousness as complex organisms is unsurprising. There is nothing else other than sense which could theoretically define the depths or connect them sensibly to the peripheries. It is all sense, but not all our sense. The distinction here is not between sense and nonsense but realism and unrealism. The sense which is most real to us is that which has the greatest proximity to our personal, collective, and morphological inertial frame. That which is most distal to our perceptual inertial frame is presented to us as unreal.

In Sixteenth Series of the Static Ontological Genesis, he sketches out a rather convoluted seeming schema of the interrelation of monads, persons, and worlds which I think lacks clarity. The multisense view of selves as temporal privacies casting a spatial public shadow on many levels seems to me a simpler and readily verifiable model.
That’s almost halfway. Time for a break but I plan to come back to this soon.

Critique of Lanza’s Biocentricism Principles

August 2, 2012 Leave a comment

take-contr0l:

  1. What we perceive as reality is a process that involves our consciousness. An “external” reality, if it existed, would by definition have to exist in space. But this is meaningless, because space and time are not absolute realities but rather tools of the human and animal mind.
  2. Our external and internal perceptions are inextricably intertwined. They are different sides of the same coin and cannot be divorced from one another.
  3. The behavior of subatomic particles, indeed all particles and objects, is inextricably linked to the presence of an observer. Without the presence of a conscious observer, they at best exist in an undetermined state of probability waves.
  4. Without consciousness, “matter” dwells in an undetermined state of probability. Any universe that could have preceded consciousness only existed in a probability state.
  5. The structure of the universe is explainable only through biocentrism. The universe is fine-tuned for life, which makes perfect sense as life creates the universe, not the other way around. The “universe” is simply the complete spatio-temporal logic of the self.
  6. Time does not have a real existence outside of animal-sense perception. It is the process by which we perceive changes in the universe.
  7. Space, like time, is not an object or a thing. Space is another form of our animal understanding and does not have an independent reality. We carry space and time around with us like turtles with shells. Thus, there is no absolute self-existing matrix in which physical events occur independent of life.

In my view, biocentrism is almost on the right track. Lanza is right that space and time are not absolute realities, but I think he may be wrong that they are tools of the human and animal mind. I think that individual cognitive bias, especially in assuming the quality of awareness and agency outside of the individual, is fantastically underestimated. If living organisms were not here to make geological time seem slow, I see no particular reason to assume that time and space would not also be the ‘tools’ used by the mineral kingdom, or in the astrophysical scale. Why assume that organic life is what the universe is all about? Left to their own devices inorganic minerals like zinc and manganese do this:

Speed it up to a rate of a thousand years a second and you’ve got something more like sparks or even…feelings within the Earth’s crust.

For his #2, I agree that they are different sides of the same coin, but I would not say that they cannot be divorced from the other. The multisense continuum is a syzygy where interior realism and exterior realism are identical in some sense, overlapping in some sense, orthogonal in some sense, and elaborated to separate and idiopathic extremes in another sense. We don’t have to have a doctrine where every phenomenon must translate meaningfully into the other side of the coin. Fiction and fact influence each other, but they can influence themselves independently of each other as well.

#3 I think is pulling from initial enthusiasm over the Copenhagen interpretation and applying it in the familiar new age way. I’m not saying there is no truth to that, and yes, in most general sense, all descriptions of the universe are inextricably linked to the presence of an ‘observer’, but my conjecture continues to be that we have got Quantum Mechanics completely inside out. The interpretation I suggest is that the further we get into the microcosm, the more our measurements are solipsistically reflecting the instruments being used, so that what we assume are exotic particle-waves appearing and disappearing, making two opposite choices at once, being in two places at once, etc are not objective realities at all but rather the end of our ability to detect objects in space and the beginning of subjects ability to construct experiences through time. It’s that simple. Shocking, but I think it deserves serious consideration.

4. Eh, again, this ‘probability state’ is a figment of the mathematical imagination. Probability is great for a posteriori analysis but it is literally nonsense as a concrete reality. Probabilities, potentials, emergent properties, “information”,…these are all 21st century figments of hypertrophied empiricism. No superposition of bytes ever did anything to anything by itself. What Lanza should do here is connect the ‘different sides of the same coin’ notion up to matter and see that matter and consciousness are literally different aspects of the same thing (and that thing is the very capacity to experience the symmetry of matter and consciousness…’sense’ or perception and participation.) Once you aren’t chained to living organisms being the only source of experience, and biological time being the only scale that experiences can occur through, then there is no reason to think that there has ever been a universe without consciousness – they are, in fact, the same thing.

5. I see where he is coming from and agree in the sense that the universe cannot be explained only as a bottom-up emergence from nothingness, it requires the contrary principle as well – which would be something like a continuous recovery of everythingness from diffracted or masked states (I have been calling it ‘solitropy‘ or ‘wholes through holes’…trans-rational or elliptical algebras).

6. I agree, only I don’t discriminate against non animals. Everything senses or makes sense to something, and with solitropy, it is possible that if the entire universe collapsed into a singularity (again?), it would still retain exactly the same totality of sense that it has ever had. There is only one thing, and it is an experience, and it divides itself into experiences of un-division.

7. Yes, space is a form of understanding and not primitively real, but the experience of acoustics – cymatics, vibration, the tangible aesthetics of inanimate substances should be a clue that space awareness is not limited to animals. Crystalized minerals, whirling solar systems, etc have been exploring space with matter for billions of human years (even if its just been a long summer’s day on those geological scales). What Lanza does not consider is that the universe might be a worthwhile spectacle without any animal life at all. He has the right idea about the realism of the universe being much more profoundly localized than we currently assume, and even in a round about way that life is the fundamental thing that we as living organisms should concern ourselves with, but if we really want to connect all of the dots, I think that we need to see it isn’t biology that makes the universe go round, it’s sense.

The Third Eve

Who we are becoming.

Shé Art

The Art of Shé D'Montford

Astro Butterfly

Transform your life with Astrology

Be Inspired..!!

Listen to your inner self..it has all the answers..

Rain Coast Review

Thoughts on life... by Donald B. Wilson

Reflections

Steven Colborne's Philosophical Theology Blog

Amecylia

Multimedia Project: Mettā Programming DNA

SHINE OF A LUCID BEING

Astral Lucid Music - Philosophy On Life, The Universe And Everything...

I can't believe it!

Problems of today, Ideas for tomorrow

Rationalising The Universe

one post at a time

Conscience and Consciousness

Academic Philosophy for a General Audience

yhousenyc.wordpress.com/

Exploring the Origins and Nature of Awareness

DNA OF GOD

BRAINSTORM- An Evolving and propitious Synergy Mode~!

Paul's Bench

Ruminations on philosophy, psychology, life

This is not Yet-Another-Paradox, This is just How-Things-Really-Are...

For all dangerous minds, your own, or ours, but not the tv shows'... ... ... ... ... ... ... How to hack human consciousness, How to defend against human-hackers, and anything in between... ... ... ... ... ...this may be regarded as a sort of dialogue for peace and plenty for a hungry planet, with no one left behind, ever... ... ... ... please note: It may behoove you more to try to prove to yourselves how we may really be a time-traveler, than to try to disprove it... ... ... ... ... ... ...Enjoy!

Creativity✒📃😍✌

“Don’t try to be different. Just be Creative. To be creative is different enough.”

Political Joint

A political blog centralized on current events

zumpoems

Zumwalt Poems Online